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Chapter 1:  
Introduction  
The Indian American community was vital to explaining this strategic bill to our 
fellow citizens. I appreciate so very much your carrying the message not only here 
at home, but in India. And I want you to know that your voice was very effective, 
and I welcome it. 
 George W. Bush, President of the United States 1 
The historic agreement on cooperation in the development of civilian nuclear 
energy in India that President George Bush and I embarked upon is nearing 
fruition [...]. It is in no small measure due to the very supportive role the Indian 
American community and the friends of India in the US have played. I thank you 
all for this. 
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India 2 
 
The U.S.-India nuclear pact, first announced by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and 
U.S. President George W. Bush over reciprocal state visits in July 2005 and March 2006, caught 
the world by surprise. Seen as the touchstone of a new strategic partnership between the two 
democracies, the agreement gives India a status as a de facto nuclear weapon state and access to 
the international market for nuclear material.3 As India has not signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or adopted full-scope safeguards, the agreement provides for a unique 
exception to U.S. and international export laws. Finally taken out of its “nuclear isolation”, 
                                                 
 
1 President George W. Bush, speech to Congress, 18.12.06. See: White House (2006)   
2 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speech at Hotel Waldorf, New York, 28.09.08. See: The Economic Times (2008)  
3 The agreement stopped short of giving India a de jure nuclear weapon state (NWS) status. There is widespread consensus, 
however, that the agreement gives India a de facto NWS status. See: Lodgaard, Sverre (forthcoming) 
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India can expand its civilian nuclear sector to satisfy booming energy needs, vital to keep up 
current rates of economic growth.4  
Constituting a path-breaking policy shift that reversed more than 30 years of U.S. policy toward 
the non-proliferation regime, the deal was also the subject of harsh criticism. Remarkably, as late 
as in 1998, the United States had imposed economic sanctions and led international efforts 
through the UN Security Council and the G8 to condemn India to a “pariah status” after it had 
conducted nuclear tests. By contrast, the deal the Bush administration had negotiated would not 
only give India the freedom to continue, but even the possibility to increase the production of 
fissile material to make more bombs. Prior to the deal, India was estimated to be able to produce 
6-10 weapons annually. With the deal, however, experts estimated India could produce up to 50 
weapons a year (Kessler 2006a).5 “A step towards the break-up of the non-proliferation regime”, 
warned Strobe Talbott (2005), one of the Clinton-administration’s top officials.  
Considering the peculiar timing of the policy shift, occurring at a time the U.S. was trying to 
galvanize international support against Iran’s nuclear program, many feared that to “reward” 
India, a friend, would create a dangerous precedent and send out signals of double standards to 
the world. With an increasingly unpopular President Bush, the New York Times expected “a 
contentious battle” in Congress over whether to ratify the agreement, “with an outcome far from 
certain” (Weisman 2006). Similarly, the Washington Post predicted the nuclear agreement would 
“face a hard sell” (Kessler 2006b). Yet, to the surprise of many, it passed with broad bipartisan 
support in two rounds, first in 2006 and then finally in 2008.6 The landslide approval of the deal 
in the U.S. Congress has by a number of researchers been attributed to the energetic lobby 
                                                 
 
4 As of 2006, nuclear energy accounted for less than 3 percent of India’s electricity production. By 2030, the Indian government 
wants to raise this share to 12.5 percent. For 2050, the ambitious target is 25 percent. See: Cooper, Matthew (2007) 
5 India was previously forced to divide its limited domestic resources of uranium between civilian and military purposes. Getting 
international market access to its civilian program (even without a stop in its production of fissile material as a pre-condition), it 
was argued that India could free-up its domestic sources of uranium and use it exclusively for weapons purposes. See: Kessler, 
Glenn (2006a).  
 6 The passage of the agreement in the United States took place in a two-step process. The U.S. and India had negotiated a basic 
framework for an agreement in 2005-06. The first vote, in late 2006, was on the principle of making an exception to US laws to 
permit nuclear trade with India, a non-NPT member. The legislation also specified under which conditions Congress would 
accept this exception to the law. The second vote, in October 2008, was the final up-down vote on the agreement.  
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campaign of the Indian American community (Andersen 2006a,b; Gottschlich 2006;  Kirk 2008). 
This thesis investigates that claim. As late as at the turn of the millennium, Smith (2000:3) 
concluded that “no group of Asian Americans today has an important place at the table in [U.S.] 
foreign policy discussions as an ethnic constituency”.7 With the massive mobilization of the 
Indian Diaspora to ratify the nuclear pact, is the time ripe to revisit Smith’s conclusion? 
Moreover, what has enabled the Indian immigrant group to form an active and seemingly strong 
foreign policy lobby?  
1.1 A foreign policy victory for the Bush administration 
Finally signed into law on October 8, 2008, after passing multiple hurdles—domestically in the 
United States and India, as well as internationally through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a cartel 
of states regulating trade in nuclear materials—the passage of the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement 
represented a rare foreign policy victory for President Bush. At the signing ceremony in the 
White House, President Bush had indicated that he wanted to use the opportunity to thank those 
who had worked to secure the passage of the deal; of 200 invited guests, more than half of them 
were Indian Americans (Haniffa 2008a).    
Present at the signing ceremony, Swadesh Chatterjee, leader of the U.S.-India Friendship 
Council, proudly stated: "When we started this journey three years ago, no one thought that the 
deal would get through the U.S. Congress. But the skeptics underestimated the respect and 
influence of the Indian American community” (Haniffa 2008b). Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Chief 
Negotiator on the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement, has also acknowledged the effort of the Indian 
American community to secure the passage of the controversial deal. Speaking to a largely South 
Asian audience he declared: “This has been your coming out party in our country [...] passage of 
the legislation [on the U.S.-India nuclear agreement] could not have occurred without the strong 
support of the Indian-American community” (Burns 2006). 
                                                 
 
7 See also: Khagram, Sanjeev et.al (2001).  
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True, statements like the ones above could in part be attributed to Indian American leaders own 
wish to boost their prestige, or in the case of diplomat Burns, as a “party toast” speech to please 
an enthusiastic audience. In spite of significant media coverage (the Washington Post even 
featured an article with a headline reading “The New AIPAC? Forget the Israel Lobby. The Next 
Big Player on the Hill is Made in India”), to date only one comprehensive case study has been 
conducted on the influence of the Indian American lobby on the U.S.-India nuclear agreement.8 
In a study published in Foreign Policy Analysis, Jason Kirk (2008:277) claims:  
In 2006, two historical stories converged: one involving the ongoing deepening of 
the U.S.-India relationship since 1998, the other a general consolidation of 
organizational capacity within the burgeoning Indian community in the United 
States.  Without the latter, it is unlikely that the bold U.S.-India nuclear agreement 
would have made it over the requisite congressional hurdles in 2006. 
Kirk’s case study, while being highly interesting, has two major weaknesses that this thesis seeks 
to address. First, the study included only one personal interview with the Chairman of the U.S.-
India Political Action Committee (USINPAC), one of the two leading lobby organizations for the 
community, and none with other relevant actors. Second, and related to this, Kirk’s study paid 
only limited attention to other possible explanations for Congress’s strong vote in favor of the 
controversial agreement. As a priority for this thesis, I set out to increase the number of 
interviewees and to try to give a broader overview of other contextual factors surrounding the 
successful ratification of the agreement.  
1.2 “Bringing the statesmen back in” 
Ethnic interest groups, as Ambrosio (2002a:2) defines them, can be understood as “political 
organization[s] established along cultural, ethnic, religious or racial lines by an ethnic group for 
the purposes of directly or indirectly influencing the foreign policy of their resident country in 
support of the homeland and/or ethnic kin abroad with which they identify”. Whereas most 
research traditionally has focused on such groups’ autonomous attempts to influence state actors, 
the reverse relationship, that is, the possibility that state actors deliberately use ethnic interest 
                                                 
 
8 To read the article in the Washington Post, see: Kamdar, Mira (2007). The New York Times even ran a front page story on the 
Indian American lobbying. See: McIntire, Mike (2006).  
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groups in order to further policy interests, has largely been neglected by researchers (Haney & 
Vanderbush 1999; Hägel & Peretz 2005). 
While not discarding the agency of Indian American lobby groups, I will argue that one factor 
that has been largely overlooked is the way both the Bush administration and the government of 
India have courted the Indian American community. During the ratification process on the 
controversial bilateral Civil Nuclear Agreement, community leaders cooperated closely with 
both governments in order to persuade a sceptical U.S. Congress.9 Vital to the legacy of both 
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh, the nuclear agreement ran into controversy in both 
capitals and left both statesmen in need of allies. 
The adopted theoretical framework for this thesis, Robert D. Putnam’s two-level theory for 
international negotiations, may serve to frame this reality quite well. Putnam (1988) emphasizes 
how Heads-of-States are simultaneously involved in bargaining at two levels, as international 
agreements negotiated with foreign counterparts (Level 1) subsequently must be ratified by 
domestic institutions at home (Level 2). Putnam’s theory opens up for several ways in which 
creative statecraft from a Chief of Government (COG) can change domestic constraints to get an 
international agreement ratified. “Coalition building” with different domestic groups, which the 
Bush administration’s active collaboration with Indian American groups shows, is just one of the 
strategies in a statesman’s toolbox (Moravcsik 1993:24-27; Putnam 1988:450-452).   
Mother India has paid close attention to the emerging political activism of the Indian American 
community too.  A 2002-report by a Government of India commission remarked:  
                                                 
 
9 It is also well worth noting that the same Indian American lobby groups were asked by Prime Minister Singh to put pressure on 
the reluctant opposition in India. See: Mitra, Devirupa (2007).  
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Indo-Americans… have played a crucial role in generating a favorable climate of 
opinion in the [U.S.] Congress… The Indian community in the United States 
constitutes a formidable new asset in strengthening India’s relationship with the 
world’s only superpower (Government of India 2002:160) 
The Government of India has in recent years enacted a number of reforms to reach out to its 
extended nation abroad, including the creation of a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. Stephen 
Walt (2005:211-12), pointing out how focused the Indian government has been on reaping the 
benefits of its Diaspora, concludes that Indian-Americans are regarded by New Delhi as a 
“potent political weapon” in a strategy of “domestic penetration” aimed at favorably influencing 
U.S. policy toward India.  
In his two-level framework, Robert D. Putnam (1988) opens up for the possibility that statesmen 
make efforts to influence the internal politics of a foreign counterpart. Moravcsik (1993:27) even 
concludes that it is rather common: Statesmen have strong incentives to do so because it 
“simultaneously increases the probability both of an agreement and of reaching a more 
advantageous one”. For India— the 2.7 million strong Indian American community, being one of 
the fastest growing and financially most robust ethnic groups in the United States— this gives 
rise to an interesting proposition: what are the consequences of having politically mobilized 
Diaspora participating within the American decision-making arena? 
This thesis will argue that it makes sense to conceptualize the role of ethnic interest groups 
within a two-level theory framework. Ethnic interest groups, I will argue, have a unique strategic 
position in the conduct of international negotiations, and, in a broader sense, bilateral relations.  
They can participate in the domestic politics of two countries simultaneously. This also explains 
why state actors— both in the Diaspora’s “ancient homeland” and the “host country”—may have 
a clear-cut interest in establishing links to an ethnic interest group in order to further vital foreign 
policy goals.  
1.3 Research questions 
In wake of Stephen Walt and John D. Mearsheimer’s work on the “Israel Lobby” (2007), the 
topic of ethnic interest groups has received increased attention from scholars and the media alike. 
However, as existing scholarly literature on ethnic lobbies and American foreign policy typically 
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focuses on Jewish, Armenian and Cuban Americans, the Indian immigrant group provides an 
interesting new case to examine. This thesis asks: 
I. What brought about the Indian American immigrant group’s surge of political 
clout? 
II. How and to what extent did the Indian American community influence the 
ratification process on the nuclear agreement in the United States? 
III. How can the two-level framework inform our understanding of the role of 
politically mobilized Diaspora groups? 
 
1.4 Aims 
In order to answer the first research question, I will examine the emergence of the Indian 
American lobby and look how it corresponds with existing theory. The literature points to certain 
“scope conditions” under which effective ethnic lobbies operate and succeed. These scope 
conditions include both specific attributes (financial, organizational and demographic factors) of 
an ethnic community as well as to contextual factors (features of the American political system, 
the international context) that favor their success. How does the Indian immigrant group fit this 
pattern of ethnic lobby empowerment?  
Second, determining the actual influence of an interest group is as one lobbyist has noted, “like 
finding a black cat in the coal bin at midnight” (quoted in Loomis and Cigler 2002:28). 
Conscious that the influence of lobby groups is highly difficult to measure, this thesis poses the 
second question in order to map the Indian American lobby efforts, and gather different 
statements about its impact, it does not expect to discover any definite answers as to how far this 
influence extends. Thus, my study may lay the groundwork for a plausibility probe; could the 
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Indian American community have played such a decisive role as some researchers, such as Kirk 
and others actually claim they did?10 
The third aim of this thesis, as sketched out above, is of a theoretical nature. How can theories 
from different strands of Political Science be connected in order to gain a better understanding of 
the role that ethnic interest groups can play? In spite of recent interest in ethnic lobbies, the 
knowledge-base on the topic is still underdeveloped. While the main focus of this thesis is the 
ratification process in the United States, I take note of the simultaneous lobby efforts and 
potential impact of Indian Americans back in their ‘homeland affairs’. The reason for doing so is 
because I believe it may yield theoretical gains in understanding the role of ethnic interest 
groups. The use of concepts from Putnam’s two-level framework should also be understood 
within this exploratory framework: The goal is by no means stringent theory-testing, but rather to 
use the theory as my conceptual lenses to explain how ethnic lobby groups can occupy a 
strategic space that is quite unique in bilateral negotiations.  
1.5 Methodological concerns 
Given the focus on one main unit (the Indian American immigrant group), the form (how/what 
extent) and the substance (the ratification process on the U.S.-India nuclear deal) of the research 
questions, a single case study stands out as the most appropriate research design (cf. Yin 2003:5-
7). The virtue of the single case study, as practitioners of the method point out, is the depth of 
analysis that it offers (Gerring 2007:49). However, most commonly associated with detailed, 
holistic and “thick” description of events, many—particularly adherents of statistical analysis—
have expressed doubts about the single case study method’s usefulness for general knowledge 
development.  
Case study researchers have delineated arguments to counter this critique: “A case study”, 
Gerring argues, “may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of 
                                                 
 
10 Pierre Gottschlich (2006:19) goes even further than Kirk (2008) and maintains: “The nuclear deal between the two 
governments [the U.S. and India] in 2006 would have been unthinkable if it was not for the supporting role of the Indian 
Diaspora in the United States.” Similarly, Walter K. Andersen (2006a) finds that “perhaps most important [for the Congressional 
approval], was vigorous lobbying, especially the efforts of the increasingly influential Indian-American community.” 
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that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)” (ibid.:20). 
Thus, according to this line of thinking, the defining question becomes “what is this a case of ?” 
(ibid.:13). The focus for this study is on the specifically ethnic component of the India lobby.11  
As such, the broader population of cases that my findings can be related to consist of “ethnic 
groups’ organized attempts to influence U.S. foreign policy.” 
Second and related to this, precisely because of the depth that the single case study offers, the 
method is regarded as particularly apt for theory development, which is one of the aims here. 
Gerring (2007:39-42) points out that the strength of the single case study method lies in its 
ability to generate new hypothesis, much more so than in theory testing per se:  
It is the very fuzziness of case studies that grants them an advantage in research at 
the exploratory stage, for the single-case study allows one to test a multitude of 
hypotheses in a rough-and-ready way... A large-N cross-case study, by contrast, 
allows for the testing of only a few hypotheses but does so with a somewhat 
greater degree of confidence... 
(…)Theory testing is not the case study’s strong suit. The selection of ‘crucial’ 
cases is at pains to overcome the fact that the cross-case N is minimal. Thus, one 
is unlikely to reject a hypothesis, or to consider it definitely proved, on the basis 
of a single case.  
Yet another advantage that the depth of the single case study can offer, may be the 
comprehensive overview of contextual factors surrounding the outcome of a process. Even 
though case studies can provide no control over the environment, making direct cause-and-effect 
relationships much more difficult to track than within the scientific experimental method, Robert 
K.Yin (2003) claims single case studies—if conducted properly—indeed can be a well suited 
method to investigate claims of causality. As noted, given the intrinsic difficulties of measuring 
                                                 
 
11 This demarcation is not self-evident. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007:132), in their study of the Israel lobby are careful to point 
out that “[T]he lobby is defined not by ethnicity or religion but by a political agenda.” Even though the Jewish make up the bulk 
of the lobby, their definition is so broad that it may encompass even Christian, pro-Israeli organizations. If I were to follow the 
same definition, groupings such as the U.S.-India Business Council, with a significant—but not exclusive— Indian American 
membership, would be included here. By focusing exclusively on the ethnic component of the lobby, however, my study follows 
the same demarcation as Kirk (2008).     
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the influence of lobbyists, this study takes a cautious approach inasmuch as its primary aim was 
not to make causal inferences.  
Still, I believe that Kirk (2008), by focusing almost exclusively on the Indian American effort, 
has downplayed other factors in the ratification process that may have played an equally strong, 
or potentially more important role than the Indian American lobby. At the very least, Indian 
Americans’ claim of influence must be weighed against other rival explanations of the landslide 
vote in favor of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. Thus, in order to give an assessment of the 
relative importance of the Indian American lobby, I try to identify rival explanations (the 
strategies of the Bush administration, procedural rules, and the role of other lobbyists) that could 
have influenced the outcome (successful ratification by the U.S. Congress).  
1.5.1 A note on the sources: Validity and reliability 
The data material consists of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include 
official documents (speeches, reports etc.) from the U.S. and Indian governments respectively, as 
well as testimonies from representatives in the U.S. Congress. The author also conducted a series 
of interviews with relevant actors during October 2008. Secondary sources include news 
clippings, books and articles from journals. I have specifically searched the archives of the New 
York Times and Washington Post, as well as that of India Abroad, arguably the most important 
media for the Indian community in the United States, for stories on the U.S.-India Nuclear 
Agreement. 
The overall quality of the relevant sources is customarily evaluated according to their validity 
and reliability. Validity refers to the relevance of the various sources vis-à-vis the research 
question. That is, to what extent the data material can reveal something relevant about the 
research question (Hellevik 1991:103). Reliability, on the other hand, refers to the accurateness 
of the data material, and to the extent to which one can expect to receive the same result if the 
analysis is repeated (ibid.).  I will in the following elaborate on the challenges to the study’s 
validity and reliability. 
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1.5.2 Challenges to validity and reliability 
An important part of my data collection was the interviews I conducted in Washington D.C.  I 
sent out requests to around 20 people whose names I had come over in my research. In the end I 
conducted 12 interviews, nine of which are included in this study.1213 The interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured manner in the sense that a set of questions were prepared before-
hand (see the attached interview guide in appendix II), but still left the author enough flexibility 
to probe for details and ask follow-up questions.  
A weakness of interview-data is that they can be vulnerable to poorly constructed questions 
resulting in a response bias or reflexivity—where the interviewee “gives what the interviewer 
wants to hear” (Yin 2003:86). Problems may also arise from poor or inaccurate articulation on 
the part of the interviewee (ibid.:92). To account for this, I offered the interviewees the chance to 
correct their statements in writing after I had transcribed them.14 Another challenge regards 
representativeness: Interviews may more than anything else reflect a personal interpretation of 
events. In order to better validate statements from interviewees, Steinar Kvale (2001:148) divides 
interviewees into informants (witnesses) and representatives (the study objects). This may be a 
particularly important challenge to the validity here, especially as the study objects, 
representatives of the Indian American lobby, may have an interest in promoting their own role 
in the process for status/prestige reasons. 
Aware of this pitfall, my aim was to mitigate this problem of representativeness by seeking 
testimonies from multiple sources on the role of Indian Americans in the ratification process of 
the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement. Like Kirk (2008), I approached the leader of U.S.-India 
Political Action Committee (USINPAC), but in addition, I interviewed the leader of the U.S.-
                                                 
 
12 One challenge to the validity of this thesis might be that it runs the risk of developing a selection bias, inasmuch as each 
interview ended with the interviewee being asked the question; “Do you have any hints regarding who I should talk to in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of the process?” Nevertheless, I argue that this approach might also have given me an advantage 
since it has led to access to informants previously unknown. Apart from this potential pitfall, I have no reason to believe that the 
group of interviewees selected should have any particular bias.  
13 These three interviews, all with political analysts, were not included here because of space limitations. Their names are listed 
in appendix I as they all contributed with important background information for this thesis.   
14 A side-effect of this was also that some quotes from the interviews were omitted from the final version of this thesis due to 
requests from the interviewee. 
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India Friendship Council, the other big, umbrella organization for Indian Americans. Moreover, I 
approached lobbyists from the opposing side of the nuclear agreement: Washington’s non-
proliferation lobby. I conducted two interviews with congressional staffers in the Foreign 
Relations Committee of the House of Representatives. Other key informants include officials 
from the U.S. State Department and the Embassy of India in Washington D.C as well as analysts 
who could comment on the issue without being direct participants in the process. More 
interviews would have been preferable, but this must be understood within the frame of 
limitations in resources, time and the availability of interviewees.15  
One common strategy to enhance validity is data triangulation, which indicates that each 
conclusion made is corroborated by multiple sources of evidence. What is essential is that the 
different data sources lead to the same conclusion about the problem investigated. If this is the 
case, the validity of the conclusion made is strengthened (Yin 2003: 97). In this case I have tried 
to achieve a triangulation both by comparing the views expressed of the role of Indian 
Americans between the interviewees themselves as well as to check and compare the interview-
data with other data sources.   
Another principle in order to increase the validity is to “maintain a chain of evidence” that makes 
it possible for an external observer to trace the researcher’s argument (Yin 2003:98). In this case, 
I have tried to achieve this by including numerous citations of and references to the statements 
that constitute the basis of my investigation. Furthermore, almost all interviews were made with 
a tape recorder and transcribed, which makes it possible to check them.16 Regarding the written 
material, it is all readily available to the public. These precautions also address the question of 
reliability: demonstrating that a different researcher could collect the same data with the same 
result (ibid:105).  
                                                 
 
15 The timing of the data collection, occurring during a hasty “lame duck” session with both the U.S.-India nuclear agreement and 
the financial crisis on the agenda, in addition to a presidential campaign, made the availability of some potential informants 
difficult. 
16 Two of the interviewees requested that the interview would not be taped. See appendix I. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two gives a deeper introduction into two-level theory and a review of the literature on 
ethnic interest groups.  Chapter three gives background information on U.S.-India relations and 
describes how the “nuclear difference” has been a major irritant in their bilateral relationship. 
The symbolism of this issue can also give an insight into why it mobilized so many Indian 
Americans. 
Chapter four gives a description of the context of the negotiations and particularly on what kind 
of constraints President Bush would face in order to get this controversial diplomatic initiative 
ratified. In chapter five the focus shifts and I provide a profile of the Indian American 
community. I look at the lobby’s relations with the government of India and the Bush 
administration, and describe how the nuclear agreement may have paved the way for a 
consolidation of its lobby capabilities.  Chapter six discusses the process from the day Congress 
was presented with the first bill until the nuclear agreement was finally passed after two rounds. 
The role of the Indian American groups is given special attention. 
In chapter seven I provide alternative explanations as to why Congress, with the opposition 
Democratic Party holding the majority, went along with and agreed to pass the deal. With this 
backdrop I discuss where and when the Indian American lobbying could have had an impact in 
the U.S. ratification process and I make some concluding remarks relevant to research question 
(ii). Finally, in chapter eight, the main focus is on how and why the community’s political clout 
surged. In that regard, I highlight the potential similarities and differences between the 
mobilization of the Indian Americans and other ethnic groups that have established strong 
lobbies. Thus, I conclude chapter eight by making concluding remarks corresponding to my 
research questions (i), and (iii): which theoretical lessons can the case of the Indian American 
lobby—“the New Kids on the Block”— teach us?  




Ethnic interest groups are customarily assumed to be autonomous in their attempts to influence 
state actors. According to Hägel and Peretz (2005), this may be due to a traditional reliance on 
social movement theory which views politics from a ‘society versus state’ perspective. Non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s), by their very name emphasize independence from the 
state, and are therefore usually studied in their efforts to influence state actors in order to reach 
certain material or normative goals. Thus, the reverse relationship is being undermined, and most 
research neglects the possibility that states use ethnic interest groups for their own interest (ibid). 
Why then, would state actors encourage and engage with ethnic interest groups on foreign policy 
questions? Provided that mutual interests exist, ethnic interest groups can draw attention both 
from state representatives in the ‘host country’ and those of their ‘ancient homeland’ or country 
of origin. This “utility” of an ethnic lobby to the state actor, in turn, may be perceived as a 
function of the lobby’s potential to wield influence. This is the link between the literature on 
ethnic interest groups and one key question that this thesis seeks to answer: what makes an ethnic 
lobby effective? In the following section I will present a basic framework to describe how and 
why state actors may see a utility in ethnic interest groups, but I turn first to Robert D.Putnam’s 
theory on two-level games. 
2.1 Bargaining on two levels 
The key player in the two-level approach is the Chief of Government (COG)—variously referred 
to here as the leader, chief negotiator or the statesman.17 Participating in negotiations on two 
tables, the COG has to balance international and domestic concerns in a process of diplomacy. 
The negotiating process is broken down into two stages. At the international (Level I) the COG 
                                                 
 
17 In reality, however, it may be the ministers or diplomats who carry out the technical aspects of a negotiation. Peter B. 
Evans(1993:429) writes that “while in many cases the referent for “COG” is an individual leader, it often makes sense to 
conceptualize the COG as a (relatively small) group of central decision-makers within which particular decisions are generated 
with varying degrees of collective input.”  
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meets other heads of states to negotiate a tentative international agreement.  At the domestic 
level (Level II), the respective COG’s face their constituents which may include different 
political parties, interest groups, bureaucratic agencies and legislators in separate discussions 
over whether to ratify the agreement (Moravcsik 1993:23). 
The ratification process is the “crucial theoretical link” between domestic and international 
politics, although as Putnam(1988: 438-39) makes clear, this is a major simplification, in reality 
the international and domestic phases are intertwined and simultaneous, as developments in one 
arena affects negotiations in the other.  
 






   A 
Leader







Level II Level II Level I 
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2.2 The concept of ‘win-sets’ 
An important aspect of two-level game is the ‘win-set’, which is defined as the “set of all 
potential L1- agreements that can be ratified by the domestic constituency in a straight up-or-
down vote against the status quo of no-agreement” (Moravcsik 1993:23). The ‘win-set’ 
constitutes a measure, albeit abstract as such, of how much room for manoeuvre a negotiator has 
to conclude an agreement and get it ratified at home. As showed in the box below, an 
international accord is possible only if the Level II ‘win-sets’ of the parties to an agreement 
overlap. 
 
Figure 2.2:  The importance of overlapping ‘win-sets’ 
 
Hence, larger ‘win-sets’ make an agreement more likely. However, the relative size of the 
respective Level II ‘win-sets’ will also affect the distribution of the joint gains from the 
international bargain. The larger a perceived ‘win-set’ of a negotiator, the more he can be 
“pushed around” by other Level I negotiators. Conversely, as demonstrated by the hypothetical 
example in figure 2.1 above, state A can strike a deal closer to its preferred outcome (State A 
max.) because its win-set is smaller than that of state B. A small domestic ‘win-set’ can therefore 
be a major bargaining advantage: Putnam quotes a British diplomat as saying that “I’d like to 
accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at home” as “the natural thing to say at the 





Win-set state B 
Win-set state A 
Possibility for an 
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2.3 The role of the statesman 
With the exclusive power to negotiate internationally (agenda setting), the COG may have 
extensive autonomy—a freedom from domestic constraints which is likely to decrease over time 
as agreements face the prospect of a ratification at home (Moravcsik 1993:27).  Besides enjoying 
the exclusive right to submit international agreements for domestic ratification, the COG has a 
“tacit veto” over any agreement. Even if a proposed deal lies within or outside the national ‘win-
set’, a L-1 deal is unlikely to be struck if the COG personally opposes it (ibid:23). 
Thus, the policy preferences of the COG matter. To better understand them, Moravcsik 
introduces the concept of ‘acceptability-set’—which encompasses “the set of agreements 
preferred by the statesman to the status quo” (ibid:30). The political preferences of the COG may 
reflect (1) a wish to enhance his/her own position domestically through successful participation 
on the world stage; (2) the wish to find an optimal solution to an international problem or simply 
(3) individual preferences deriving from personal idealism or historical experience (ibid).  Hence 
the ‘acceptability-set’ of the COG can diverge substantially from the median domestic 
constituents. 
2.4 The domestic constraints 
In a two-level framework the most fundamental constraint on the COG is the size of his ‘win-
set’, which is primarily determined by the preferences and coalitions among domestic coalitions 
and the relevant institutional procedures for ratification that an agreement requires. Domestic 
coalitions form on the basis of an assessment of relative costs and benefits of negotiated 
alternatives to the status quo alternative of no-agreement. The logic is simple: “The less the costs 
of no-agreement is, the smaller the ‘win-set’ and vice versa” (Putnam 1988: 442). The domestic 
constraints on policy-makers depends not only on the different groups calculations of interests, 
however, but on their political influence and power. Again, as Putnam notes, “what counts 
[domestically] is not total national costs and benefits, but their incidence, relative to existing 
coalitions and proto-coalitions” (ibid:451). 
The nature of political institutions and the procedures for ratification is the second factor that 
determines ‘win-set’ size. A two-thirds majority required for ratification as opposed to a mere 
simple majority decreases the ‘win-set’ size and puts increased constraints on the COG. In the 
  18 
 
case of India, the constitution does not stipulate that international agreements must be ratified by 
parliament. This should theoretically have expanded India’s ‘win-set’, however, other 
institutional factors than formal ratification procedures can matter too. Some political 
configurations, such as coalition governments (as is the case in many parliamentary systems), 
may create more ratification points and potential veto-players, constraining the autonomy of the 
COG (ibid.:450). On the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the ratification rules became a politicized 
matter in both Washington and New Delhi. In essence, as the events unfolded, the deal would 
require a simple majority to get passed in both (the U.S. and Indian) parliaments, though the 
hurdle to secure a final passage was raised somewhat on the U.S. side due to the suspension of 
rules that the agreement required to get passed before the congressional recess in 2008.1819  
2.4.1 The statesman’s strategies 
Even as ‘win-sets’ are fundamentally constrained by the domestic coalitions and ratification rules 
on Level II, Putnam (1988) allows for the possibility that the COG can influence the size of 
‘win-sets’. What potential strategies does the statesman have at hand to influence the chances of 
ratification of an accord?   
The COG can try to influence ‘win-sets’ in four basic ways (see figure 2.2 below).   First, he or 
she may attempt actions aimed at domestic constituencies. One strategy is “issue-linkage”— 
where a statesman may achieve ratification of a “provision previously outside the ‘win-set’ by 
linking them to more popular provisions [in other issue-areas]” (Moravcsik 1993:25). Another 
                                                 
 
18 The opposition to the agreement in India brought the matter in for parliament through a “vote of no-confidence” against Prime 
Minister Singh. Thus, a simple majority could have brought down the Singh-government and in extension (by all probability) the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal, as the vote was seen as a de facto referendum on the agreement.  
19 In the U.S. the agreement was passed in two-rounds, a procedural matter which was decided after some initial wrangling (see 
chapter six). In the first round, the amendments to the domestic law to facilitate for the agreement required a simple majority in 
both chambers of Congress. The final, bilateral 123-agreement was classed as a congressional-executive agreement (not a treaty, 
which would require a 2/3 majority in the Senate). Congressional-executive agreements are normally ratified by a simple 
majority. However, as the bill was introduced to Congress late in 2008. The Bush administration, nevertheless, wanted to 
conclude the deal while it was still in office and before the Congressional recess. Thus, the Hyde Act of 2006 - which required 
that Congress be in 30 days of continuous session to consider the final deal - had to be sidestepped. Passage of the deal under 
such circumstances required a 2/3 majority in the House of Representatives. In the Senate, even a single lawmaker could prevent 
the bill from coming up for a vote during the session. Once this hurdle was cleared, the agreement’s passage would require a 
simple majority in the Senate. See: Kerr, Paul (2008:13) 
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option is “side payments”—where domestic constituents disgruntled by a proposed agreement 
could be compensated with a benefit that is unrelated to the agreement as such, but sufficient to 
“sweeten the pie” so that the agreement can be ratified. Moreover, compared to domestic 
constituents, the COG almost certainly has more information about a proposed agreement, which 
he can manipulate, or simply withhold if it serves the purpose of getting an agreement passed. 
Other options in the COG’s toolbox may include attempts at “coalition building” through the 
selective mobilization of domestic groups (ibid.).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: The statesman’s strategies 
 
Second, COG’s may attempt to re-shape the formal or informal ratification procedures in the 
political institutions by a change of voting rules or by imposing strong party discipline. Third, as 
shown in figure 2.2 above, the statesman may even try influence the ‘win-set’ of his level-I 
international counterpart.  Moravcsik (1993) notes that policies aimed at foreign polities are quite 
common. The leader in country A may target issue-linkages or side payments by offering 
specific benefits to particularly powerful domestic constituencies or swing groups in a foreign 
country B (ibid:27). Further tactics includes “reverberation”, which occurs when specific actions 
by one country alter the expectations about an agreement held by domestic groups in a foreign 
country. Reverberation can also create a domestic backlash in the foreign country and be 
detrimental to ratification abroad (ibid:29). 
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Fourth, chief negotiators may have tactics toward other chief negotiators. Each chief negotiator 
has a strong interest in the popularity of his opposite number, as the popularity of the foreign 
party increases the foreign ‘win-set’ size, thereby increasing the odds for success. For this 
reason, Putnam (1988:451) finds that chief negotiators may cooperate tacitly toward successful 
ratification of an agreement by exchanging “political assets” to strengthen each others’ prestige. 
2.5 Ethnic interest groups and two-level theory 
In the two most important works on two-level theory, Putnam’s original article and  “Double-
Edged Diplomacy”, a work co-edited by Putnam which seeks to elaborate two-level theory, 
international human rights organizations and multinational corporations are mentioned as 
examples of transnational actors. Discussing two-level theory, Peter B. Evans notes that “actors 
with transnational ties share the statesmen’s privilege, even in an attenuated way, of participating 
internationally as well as domestically” (Evans 1993:418). Ethnic interest groups can be 
conceived of as “two-table players”— as participants in the domestic politics both in the host 
country and in the ancient homeland (Level II of both state A & B, see figure 2.0 ). Second, they 
may relate to state actors both in the ‘host country’ and the ‘ancient homeland’ (Level I actors, 
state A & B). This is what gives ethnic interest groups a unique strategic position. 
2.5.1 A mobilized Diaspora abroad—a political weapon? 
As Putnam’s model shows, state actors should theoretically have strong incentives to try to 
manipulate the ‘win-set’ of foreign counterparts. An expansion of a foreign ‘win-set’ should not 
only make an agreement more likely, but it would also imply that the odds of getting a more 
favorable agreement increase (Moravcsik 1993:28). 
Following the trends of the traditional ‘state-society’ framework that has dominated research on 
ethnic interest groups, most of the focus on Diaspora movements has been on these groups 
efforts to influence the politics of their homelands (Rytz 2008). Yet, in a recent study Shain 
(2007) draws academic attention to the reverse relationship: that is to state actors in the 
‘homeland’ actively seeking political interaction with the political representatives of its 
Diaspora. While not exactly a new empirical phenomenon, Shain points out that “with ties to 
home countries reinforced by modern modes of transportation and communication, many home 
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governments (or their opposition) now make direct patriotic appeals to their diasporas, courting 
them to influence U.S. policy” (ibid: 71). Taking notice of the growing financial and political 
clout of their Diasporas, several homeland governments have responded by creating ministries 
for Diaspora affairs and by allowing dual citizenship, thus encouraging expatriate voting rights 
(Basch et.al. 1994). 
2.5.2 Ethnic interest groups and relations to ‘host country’ state actors 
In the literature on ethnic interest groups and U.S. foreign policy, ethnic interest groups are 
usually assumed to be more successful in establishing close links to members of the U.S. 
Congress than with the executive branch. This may in part be because Congress is regarded as 
more porous, with more contact points than the executive branch. Moreover, as ethnic interest 
groups in some corners of society are looked upon with suspicion because of their foreign 
attachments, members of the executive may want to keep distance, sensitive to possible 
accusations that the conduct of foreign policy is somehow not based on the notion of ‘national 
interest’ alone.   
Nevertheless, when interests coincide, the COG could have an interest in establishing close links 
to an ethnic interest group. Haney & Vanderbush (1999), studying the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF), find that “the Reagan administration encouraged and supported the 
emergence and growth of CANF as a smart political move to help further its policy 
interests“(ibid:350). CANF was seen as important to help popularize the Reagan administration’s 
policies and persuade the opposition in Congress. Not only did the Reagan-administration fund 
the exile TV-and radio-stations that CANF ran, but it even outsourced certain governmental 
immigration-tasks of processing  the entrance of Cuban exiles to the group (ibid: 353). 
Ethnic interest groups, meanwhile, gain substantially from getting close to the locus of decision-
making because of the early access to information which allows them to mobilize quickly and 
early (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007:165-67). This can happen through explicit cooperation with 
the governmental officials as in the case of CANF, or alternatively, through a penetration of the 
government apparatus, which may happen when the lobby group succeeds in getting one of its 
“allies” appointed to a high position within the government, which Mearsheimer & Walt argue is 
one of the strengths of the Israel lobby (ibid.).   
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Another interesting perspective, though much less widespread, is that state actors in the ‘host 
country’ may have an interest in encouraging the political activism of an ethnic immigrant group 
precisely because these groups can participate in their ancient homelands affairs. Despite their 
attachments to their ‘ancient homelands’, Shain (1999) finds that ethnic interest groups may not 
betray American political values and ideals, but on the contrary, their involvement in the 
‘homeland affairs’ can be instrumental in the dissemination of American views and values 
abroad. According to such a view, politically mobilized ethnic interest groups could in fact be 
quite useful for U.S. policymakers precisely because of their “two-table” qualities. 
2.6 What makes an ethnic interest group powerful? 
Under which conditions can ethnic interest groups be effective? A wide number of criteria have 
been suggested, some of which relate to specific attributes of the ethnic community at large, 
while others refer to the broader political context in which the lobby operates. Starting with the 
latter, I will give an account of these permissive factors for ethnic lobby empowerment. 
2.6.1 Contextual factors 
Certain characteristics of the U.S. political system may make the environment especially 
permissive for ethnic interest groups to thrive. One basic reason is, as Walt and Mearsheimer 
(2007:140) contend, the ”wide-open” nature of the American political system. The late Samuel 
Huntington (2004:285-86) elaborates on this argument: 
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[...] The nature of American society and government enhances the power of 
foreign governments and Diasporas. Dispersion of authority among state and 
federal government, three branches of government, and loosely structured and 
often highly autonomous bureaucracies provides them, as it does domestic interest 
groups, multiple points of access for promoting favourable policies and blocking 
unfavourable ones. The highly competitive two-party system gives strategically 
placed minorities such as Diasporas the opportunity to affect elections in single 
member districts of the House of Representatives and at times even in state-wide 
Senate elections. In addition, multiculturalism and belief in the value of 
immigrant groups maintaining ancestral culture and identity provide a highly 
favorable intellectual, social and political atmosphere, unique for the United 
States, for the exercise of Diaspora influence. 
Moreover, electoral campaigns—which take place in frequent cycles and are very expensive to 
run—make money an important and enduring feature of politics. This is only reinforced by the 
weak regulations on campaign contributions. Francisco “Pepe” Hernandez, a former executive 
director of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) once even made a reference to 
Adam Smith’s “Money World” to explain how his organization had become so influential:  “We 
are learning from the system. This is exactly what makes the American system so great. And it is 
that small, very intensely interested groups should go to their government and lobby them and 
tell them how they feel [...] After all, we are 1.5 million Americans” (quoted in Haney & 
Vanderbursh 1999:34). 
Thus, even relatively small, but well-organized groups can exercise considerable influence if 
they are strongly committed to a particular issue and the rest of the population is largely 
indifferent. This may be especially so within foreign policy matters. Alterman (1998:136) 
highlights survey data suggesting that only about 5 percent of the American public is “active” on 
any given foreign policy issue (save vital matters of war and peace) and laments how this gives 
ethnic lobbies opportunities to thrive. 
The power of ethnic interest groups is generally believed to have been enhanced by the gradual 
strengthening of Congress’s role in foreign policy and the end of Cold War and bipolar rivalry 
(Smith 2000). Nevertheless, it must be noted that ethnic interest groups are still far more likely to 
succeed when they operate within a favorable international strategic context; i.e. proposals that 
are framed in a way that dovetail well with existing American interests (Haney & Vanderbush 
1999; Rubenzer 2008).   
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2.6.2 Group-specific attributes 
In an overview of the scholarly field, Trevor Rubenzer (2008) laments that the literature treating 
ethnic minority interests and their impact on U.S. foreign policy has developed largely through 
what he calls an “additive process”:  New studies tend to add to the list of criteria developed in 
older studies. The result is a list of potential criteria that comes dangerously close to exceeding 
the number of groups whose influence the literature hopes to explain (ibid:170). In the following 
section I will try to summarize the factors I find to be most frequently cited in the literature into 
three broad categories.  
(1) The Socio-economic profile of the ethnic group matters. Smith (2000) argues that groups 
without financial resources may have considerably more difficulty gaining access to the 
decision-making process. One basic reason may be that the socio-economic profile of a group 
may affect the interest the ethnic community can garner from politicians looking for campaign 
contributions.  “Cuban Americans and Pro-Israeli groups”, arguably the most successful ethnic 
lobbies, “are known as generous contributors” (Rubenzer 2008:72). Moreover, groups with an 
elevated socio-economic profile often have a high education level, making such communities 
more likely to have the necessary skills to advocate their issues effectively.    
(2) Organizational unity and strength: In order to maximize its influence, the Diaspora group 
should be politically unified. Unity implies either the absence of a significant opposition bloc 
within the group, or at the very least, a heavily divided in-group opposition (ibid.). 
Organizational strength would also imply a professional lobbying capability, as well as the 
resources necessary to disseminate information, screen legislators’ voting records and make 
campaign contributions to favorable candidates. A national outreach; having different local 
chapters around the country, would also enhance the organizational strength of an ethnic interest 
group.  
Another important feature of the organizational infrastructure of an ethnic interest group is to 
have a caucus in Congress. Defined as “voluntary groups of members of Congress with shared 
interests”, caucuses are often “prime players in setting and influencing the legislative agenda” 
(Hammond 1998:250). The purpose of a caucus for an ethnic interest group, Smith (2000:123) 
argues, is to “have significant political players in Congress committed to the agenda of an ethnic 
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community” so that it helps the ethnic community “become part of the system” by having “a 
place at the table” where decisions are made.  
The “institutionalization of access to policymakers” that a caucus represents, may not only be a 
“one-way” street where ethnic interest groups reach out to their members of Congress, but one of 
“mutually supportive relationships” (Watanabe 1984). While ethnic interest groups need 
legislators to do something for them, legislators may also need ethnic interest groups as they can 
provide a host of valuable resources, including information, votes, and campaign contributions. 
Because of this, Watanabe (1984:53) finds that legislators even “encourage and aggressively 
court ethnic groups and encourage their activism”.  The more common pattern, however, is that 
ethnic interest groups ask legislators with a sizeable ethnic community within his or her 
constituency to become caucus-leaders (Smith 2000:123-24).  
Another way by which ethnic interest groups can spread and deepen their influence is through 
“alliance building” with other ethnic interest groups or sectors. (Rubenzer:172). “Alliance 
building” with other groups may also offer the relevant ethnic group the possibility to learn 
valuable lessons through the exchange of tactics and experiences (ibid).  
(3) Geographic concentration & voter turnout: The ethnic group should be numerous enough to 
be significant in decision-makers’ electoral calculations. In the case of ethnic minority groups, 
electoral significance often means geographic concentration. Groups such as Cuban Americans, 
who constitute a small fraction of the U.S. population, constitute a key constituency in parts of 
Florida and New Jersey (Smith 2000). While an ethnic group may not be large enough to make 
an impact in state or nationwide political campaigns, it must be noted that the threshold to have 
an impact in smaller constituency races for the House of Representatives is considerably lower. 
Moreover, geographic concentration should also for quite obvious reasons make it easier for an 
ethnic group to organize than if the group is very dispersed. 
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2.7 Summary  
I started this chapter by asking why state actors should care about ethnic interest groups. I found 
that governmental representatives, both in the ‘homeland’ and the ‘host country’, could have 
incentives to establish close links with ethnic interest groups, provided that interests coincide. 
This attractiveness may, in part, derive from an ethnic interest group’s strategic position as a 
“two-table player”—as participants in the domestic politics of two countries at the same time. 
As such, lobbying from ethnic interest groups could potentially influence ‘win-sets’ in two 
different countries and thereby the very possibility of international agreements. While the 
lobbying capabilities of ethnic interest groups may get  a boost from having access to 
policymakers, a lobby’s ability to wield influence—and thereby also its attractiveness to state 
actors—is jointly determined by key variables such as the groups’ socio-economic profile, 
organizational unity and strength, as well as demographic factors. 
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Chapter 3: 
Five decades of missed opportunities 
Relations between the United States and India, the world’s oldest (uninterrupted) and biggest 
democracies respectively, have for decades been characterised by mistrust. To many, like India’s 
former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, this represents a lamentable paradox: “Five 
wasted decades of missed opportunities”, he said of post-independent India’s ties to the United 
States at the turn of the millennium (Muralidiharan 2000). Which factors have historically 
divided the United States and India? Why was the “nuclear irritant” such a crucial barrier in the 
development of positive U.S-Indian relations? This chapter will take a closer look at these two 
questions and give a brief account of U.S-India relations from India’s independence until 
President Bush takes office in 2000. 
3.1 “Estranged democracies” 
Perhaps shaped by his country’s own ideals of liberty, U.S. president Franklin D.Roosevelt had 
even during the Second World War expressed sympathy for India’s quest for independence from 
the British crown (Tellis 2006a:4). Hence, as the United States became the first country to 
exchange ambassadors with the newly independent India after the war, the hopes for a strong and 
vibrant bilateral relationship between the two democracies were running high. Yet, for most of 
the post-World War II period, this was not to be the case. 20 Indeed, historians have presented 
U.S.-Indian relations as a tale of two “estranged democracies” (Kux 1992). 
Ashley Tellis (2006a:4) has identified three historical impediments to closer U.S.-Indian ties. Of 
these, he argues that India’s traditional quest for strategic autonomy has been the most 
significant. India’s wish to choose its own ideology, policies and friends during the Cold War 
was viewed upon with suspicion by the United States. “Neutralism is immoral”, John Foster 
                                                 
 
20 The first phase after India became independent is generally described as a cordial phase of U.S.-Indian relations.  
The U.S. became India’s largest aid donor in the 1950s and 60s and assisted inter alia in the launch the “green revolution 
initiative”, a project led by Nobel Laureate Norman Borlaug, which attempted to increase agricultural production.  
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Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, famously declared, alluding to India’s non-aligned 
posture (Wallerstein 2005). As a champion of the non-aligned movement, India’s moralistic 
critique of U.S. policy in Vietnam was irritating Washington and started to put heavy strains on 
the relationship by the mid-1960s. 
Engaged in a global confrontation with Soviet communism, American policymakers saw India’s 
policy of non-alignment as a kind of moral indifference in the struggle between good and evil 
(Tellis 2006a:5). The United States meanwhile, showed little restraint in forming alliances first 
with Pakistan, through the anti-Communist Baghdad pact in 1955, and later, in the 1970s with 
China, in pursuit of containing the Soviet Union. This encirclement, in turn, was probably one of 
the key reasons India eventually ended up with a superpower patron of its own. With the signing 
of a friendship pact with the Soviet Union, heavy question marks were left beside India’s self-
proclaimed neutral status in the Cold War. Not long after, when the Nixon administration lent 
support to Islamabad in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the United States and India seemed locked 
on a collision course.  
A second constraining factor in the bilateral relationship, Tellis argues, was India’s relative 
economic weakness as seen from Washington (ibid). India’s continued economic 
underperformance and lack of connection to the Western world’s economies, meant its 
importance to the United States remained limited during the Cold War. As Rubinoff (2005: 175) 
also points out, American interests were seen as restricted in “a region more associated with 
problems rather than opportunities”. Perhaps as an indicator of its relative low priority during the 
Cold War, the South Asia region was merely a part of the Near East bureau until 1991, when it 
was given a separate bureau in the State Department (ibid.). 
3.2 The “nuclear difference” 
The third big impediment to stronger U.S.-Indo ties has been India’s status as an outlier to the 
non-proliferation regime. Even though the United States and India actually had a long history of 
cooperation in this field— the United States had built reactors and provided heavy water for 
India’s nuclear facilities since the 1950s—furious disagreements surfaced about the rules of 
nuclear commerce in the 1970s. India refused to join the NPT at its inception in 1970 on the 
grounds that it was discriminatory. The NPT only legitimizes those states that had acquired 
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nuclear weapons prior to 1967 as nuclear weapon states (NWS). As China was among these, 
India wanted to retain the option of seeking the same nuclear capability as its rival with whom it 
had fought a war as late as in 1962. From an Indian perspective, the NPT was seen as cementing 
a “nuclear apartheid”, where the “nuclear have’s” were bound to dominate the “have not’s” 
(Singh 1998). 
Even so, at the formative stages of the NPT-regime, Washington was still hopeful that India 
would sign up to the treaty. India’s nuclear test in 1974, with the use of plutonium that it had 
produced in a research reactor built by Canada with the assistance of the United States, clearly 
demonstrated the danger that nuclear technology—which had originally been transferred for 
peaceful purposes— could be used to produce nuclear weapons. 21 The result of these tests was 
that non-proliferation was elevated to become one of the core issues of American foreign policy. 
As Cohen (2000:13) notes: “Americans concluded that the world was on the edge of a rapid burst 
of nuclear proliferation. Jimmy Carter made non-proliferation the centrepiece of his foreign 
policy [...] and South Asia became a particularly important target of American non-proliferation 
legislation that included technology denials and sanctions.”  
In reaction to India’s 1974 nuclear tests, the United States moved to create an international body, 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to try to close loopholes in nuclear exports. Domestically, 
the U.S. Congress enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, which conditioned nuclear 
exports to non-nuclear weapon states on having full-scope safeguards. India’s refusal to accept 
such safeguards resulted in a nuclear embargo by the United States.22 
The American cancellation of assistance to India’s nuclear program left an enduring distrust of 
the United States amongst policymakers in New Delhi. The nuclear embargo was expanded in 
1992 when the NSG adopted the full-scope safeguards criterion for exports to non-nuclear 
                                                 
 
21 In the case of 1974 India nuclear test, the charge was too heavy to be carried and therefore not a weapon, but the explosion 
signalled that India was very close to obtaining nuclear weapons capability. 
22 In response to India’s nuclear tests, the U.S. has systematically denied broad categories of sensitive technologies to India such 
as supercomputers, missile and space technology, satellites, advanced fighters, microelectronics and fiber optics. 
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weapon states. As a consequence of these efforts, India’s nuclear program remained largely 
home-grown, cut-off from the international market for nuclear materials.  
3.3 The end of the Cold War—new opportunities 
The end of the Cold War to a large extent removed the first structural impediment for better 
U.S.-India relations. The collapse of superpower competition afforded the United States the 
opportunity to cut Pakistan loose as an ally and re-engage India, treating the two South Asian 
rivals in a more even-handed manner. The U.S. did not have to, as before, view India through the 
lenses of its friendship with the Soviet Union. U.S.-India relations could be evaluated much more 
on their own merits. For India, the rationale behind ‘non-alignment’ also disappeared somewhat, 
as the world was no longer bipolar. 
Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union, a major trading partner and source of foreign aid, 
was also partly to blame for India’s economic crisis in 1991 as it aggravated the severe balance 
of payments crisis. That in turn, forced India to abandon old socialist principles of central 
planning, and to initiate steps to liberalize its economy. Ending many public monopolies and 
facilitating more foreign direct investment, it spurred economic growth which gradually made 
India a more important market for American exports. 
3.4 The Road Block: Nuclear proliferation 
Unconstrained by the pressure of the Cold War dynamics, the years 1991-98 saw renewed efforts 
to build a new relationship. The Clinton administration adopted a “carve out” strategy, 
attempting to segregate its disagreement with India on non-proliferation, while proceeding to 
improve relations in all other issue areas (Tellis 2007: 235). 
The limitations of such a strategy, however, soon became apparent. Washington’s concern that 
the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir could lead to an all-out conventional war, which in turn 
could spur the parties to “go nuclear”, meant non-proliferation would continue to dominate U.S. 
policy towards South Asia. India’s unwillingness to sign either the NPT or the 1996 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), both top Clinton administration priorities, continued to 
hamper the relationship. 
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Finally, when India, under the lead of Prime Minister Atal Vaypayee, went ahead with nuclear 
tests in May 1998 (followed days later by Pakistani tests), it sent shock waves through the world. 
Washington was devastated and saw the tests as a “reckless Indian defiance of the non-
proliferation regime and a major threat to the regional stability on the subcontinent” (Mohan 
2006:16). The Clinton administration immediately enacted wide-ranging economic sanctions 
against both India and Pakistan. It also mobilized several other nations and international 
institutions to cut economic assistance to India.23 
3.5 Finally, engagement 
Within a month of the nuclear tests, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was 
dispatched to hold talks with India and Pakistan.  At the outset, Talbott publicly said the purpose 
of the talks was compliance with the benchmarks derived from the United Nations Security 
Resolution 1172, which asked for India and Pakistan to:  
• Sign up to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 
• Freeze the production of fissile material; 
• Join negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT); 
• Tighten export controls of sensitive technologies and commodities; 
• Adopt a non-threatening nuclear weapons posture; and, 
• To reduce the Indo-Pakistani tensions through dialogue.24  
The dialogue Talbott had with his Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh extended into 14 meetings 
over a time span of two and a half years. Ultimately it failed to achieve its top-priority of getting 
India to sign the CTBT.25 What the talks apparently did achieve, however, was a broader U.S. 
                                                 
 
23 As a result of the cuts in economic assistance(trade sanctions not included), India lost about $2 billion in foreign aid from 
international financial institutions and Japan, and another $300 million from other Western donors including the United States. 
See: Cohen, Stephen (2000) 
24 To read the resolution, see: United Nations (1998). 
25 In the end, India expressed that it needed to build its program further up before it could give consideration to a CTBT or 
FMCT. Its grounds for stating this was that it sought a “minimum credible deterrent,” which it had not yet achieved See: Weiss, 
Leonard (2007:433). 
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understanding of India’s security needs than the administration’s original non-proliferation 
“lens” had allowed (Talbott 2004).  
Then, in the summer of 1999, when Pakistani military forces penetrated the Line of Control 
separating Pakistani and Indian-administered Kashmir, Clinton pressured Pakistan to retreat.26 
India, in contrast, was lauded by Washington for demonstrating restraint and not sending its 
troops into Pakistani territory. President Clinton, who had put off his planned trip to India after 
the nuclear tests, announced a renewed interest in visiting New Delhi. 
Clinton’s visit to India, the first visit of a U.S. President since Jimmy Carter, was widely 
characterized as a success. Interestingly, for the first time, no less than 150 Indian Americans 
accompanied the U.S. delegation and Clinton’s itinerary showcased a “new India”—visiting 
places such as Hyderabad, “the high-tech city” (Iype 2000).27 In his address to the Indian 
Parliament, Clinton “[...] went into an extended critique of India’s decision to go nuclear. But the 
tone was respectful and gave the sense of debate among equals” (Mohan 2006:20). 
Instructively, whereas Clinton had stayed five days in India, he stopped only five hours in 
Pakistan on his way back home. In Islamabad, Pakistan’s military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, 
was urged to return his country to democratic rule. Rather than keeping a Cold War partiality for 
Pakistan, it seemed U.S. interest in South Asia lay ever more in advancing the dialogue with 
India. The Clinton-administration, nonetheless, continued to stress until the very end of its tenure 
that “the full potential of Indo-U.S. relations” would not be realized “until India met the nuclear 
benchmarks” (Pickering 2000). 
                                                 
 
26 During the conflict, The Washington Post reported how a new Indian American activism “boosted India’s fortunes”. 
Indian immigrants flooded Congress offices with e-mails urging Pakistani forces to withdraw: “Ultimately, the lawmakers 
complied and a few days later, in a White House meeting, Mr. Clinton cited Congressional pressure as one of the reasons in 
urging Mr. Nawaz Sharif to withdraw his forces.” See: Lancaster, John (1999) 
27 Among the many Indian Americans accompanying Clinton’s visit, members from the influential organization “Overseas 
Friends of BJP” met exclusively with the Indian Prime Minister. See: Iype, Georges (2000)  
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3.6 Summary 
India’s non-alignment in its foreign policy and its protectionist economic philosophy have 
traditionally constituted two structural barriers for closer ties with the United States. Coinciding 
with the end of the Cold War, India started undertaking major economic reforms from 1991 
onwards. These events clearly contributed to stronger U.S.-Indo ties, but one road-block 
continued to hamper the relationship: non-proliferation. 
India’s 1998 nuclear tests further aggravated this cleavage and put the bilateral relationship at a 
new, historical low-point with the imposition of U.S. sanctions. Toward the end of the reign of 
the Clinton-administration, however, a notable warming of relations with India was taking 
place—though not resolving the “nuclear difference”. 
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Chapter 4: 
The context of domestic constraints 
The goal of this chapter is to give a description of the context surrounding the negotiations and 
launch of the nuclear agreement. It will address a number of key questions, including: what kind 
of domestic constraints did the Bush-team have to take into account when they opened 
negotiations with India? How did they go about dealing with this opposition?  
4.1 A change in the making? 
In the spring of 1999, George W. Bush, then governor of Texas, was briefed for the first time by 
the team of foreign-policy advisers. Bush began with the frank admission that he knew little 
about foreign policy. His foreign policy advisors led by Condoleezza Rice delivered a broad 
survey of the world, its problems, and its prospects. When the group finished, Bush had only one 
question: “What about India?” Robert Blackwill, one of the surprised advisors present at the 
session, recalled asking Bush why he was so interested in India. Bush immediately responded: 
“A billion people in a functioning democracy. Isn’t that something? Isn’t that something?!” 
(Dugger 2001, Walker 2006). Some, apparently including Blackwill himself, have suggested that 
Bush’s interest in India had originally been stirred by his encounters with successful Indian 
Americans living in Texas. 28 29 
                                                 
 
28 Ashley Tellis, one of the U.S. architects of the nuclear deal (and himself of Indian American origin) says his friend Robert 
Blackwill use to paraphrase President Bush in the following manner on the subject of Indian Americans:  “Oh my God, here is a 
group of people so successful, so dedicated, so evocative of the American dream, then there are a billion of them somewhere in 
another part of the world; this is a country that we need to reach out to and have a new relationship with.” See: Malhotra, Jyoti 
(2008) 
29 Another source identifies one of the Indian Americans Bush had been in contact with in Texas as Durga Agrawal. Born in 
Lakhanpur, a central Indian village without water or electricity, Agrawal had earned a master’s degree at the University of 
Houston. Agrawal stayed and became a highly successful businessman.  Along with a number of other Indian Americans he 
helped build Texas’s high-tech corridor, dubbed Silicon Canyon. Agrawal was also able to raise more than $100,000 for the Bush 
presidential campaign in his local Indian community. After Bush became president, Agrawal was invited to the White House as a 
guest at the banquet for visiting Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh, where Bush introduced him as “my good friend from 
Texas.” See: Walker, Martin (2006) 
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During the presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice (2000:56) gave an upgrading of ties to India 
a balance-of-power wrapping: 
There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to 
think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But 
India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too. 
India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.  
4.2 “Bureaucratic combat” 
While the intellectual basis for transforming the U.S.-Indian relationship was already firmly in 
place during president Bush’s first term, its implementation was halting due to “bureaucratic 
combat”. U.S. ambassador to India at the time, Robert Blackwill (2005:9-17), claims two issues 
continued to hamper the relationship: 
The first were the non-proliferation “ayatollahs” [...] who despite the fact that the 
White House was intent on redefining the relationship, sought to maintain without 
essential change all of the non-proliferation approaches toward India that had 
been pursued in the Clinton Administration. It was as if they had not digested the 
fact that George W. Bush was now president. [...] These nagging nannies were 
alive and well in that State Department labyrinth.  
A second and related obstacle to closer ties, Blackwill notes, was the continued tendency to view 
India through the Pakistan-India prism (ibid). Colin Powell, Secretary of State in President 
Bush’s first term, was uncomfortable with changing basic rules of the non-proliferation regime 
due to the regional security implications in South Asia as well as the wider impact such a policy-
shift could have on the NPT-regime (Kessler 2006b; Mohan 2006:54).  
4.3 New boss, new priorities 
For the President’s second term, Condoleezza Rice replaced Powell as Secretary of State.  
Before Bush was sworn in for his second presidential period, the White House conducted a 
strategic review based on a report from the National Intelligence Council which laid out the 
long-term implications of changing international economic, military and demographic patterns: 
“How China and India exercise their growing power and whether they relate cooperatively or 
competitively to other powers in the international system are key uncertainties” (NIC 2004:47).  
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Spurred by this review, a strengthening of ties with India moved up the list of priorities of the 
“new” administration (Mohan 2006:54). 
Rice insisted that India and Pakistan ought to be treated separately from each other, strictly on 
their own terms (ibid.). The difficulty of such a “policy decoupling” of India and Pakistan soon 
became evident however. In March 2005, President Bush decided to sell F-16 jets to Pakistan as 
a part of the global war on terrorism. Rice was concerned the action would reinforce long-
standing perceptions in New Delhi of a traditional U.S. bias towards Pakistan. On her first trip to 
the South Asia region as Secretary of State, Rice therefore put the secret offer of full nuclear 
cooperation on the table in discussions with her Indian counterpart (ibid.) 
4.4 Keep it secret 
The Department of Energy certainly felt blindsided. This was a White House 
driven, rather than an inter-agency based process. (State Department official, 
interview 22.10.08) 
A radical policy-shift towards India was likely to face stiff resistance, not only from non-
proliferation lobby groups and sections of Congress, but from within the non-proliferation 
bureaucracy in the State Department and the Department of Energy. Only a small circle of 
advisors initially knew about the initiative during the first six weeks of negotiations with Indian 
diplomats in the spring of 2005 (Kessler 2006b). According to a report in the Washington Post:  
At this critical junction, one of the leading sceptics of a nuclear deal with India—
John R. Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control—was nominated 
U.N ambassador. The long battle over his appointment delayed confirmation of 
his replacement, Robert G. Joseph, until May 26. Other key posts in the non-
proliferation ranks were unfilled, leaving officials in that area thinking they no 
voice in the debate (ibid.) 
When Joseph took office on June 1st, he and his staff started outlining non-proliferation 
commitments they wanted to extract from India. The only problem was that by then, negotiations 
were already at an advanced stage. The Indians had already made it clear weeks earlier that they 
were not interested in anything that would put limits on their nuclear weapons program (ibid). 
Senior U.S. officials have rejected complaints that the expertise of government non-proliferation 
specialists was ignored in the first phase leading to the joint statement. The critical report in the 
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Washington Post, however, quotes one person involved in the policy development as saying: 
“[I]t is no accident that [nuclear experts] were not included, because you didn't have to be a seer 
to know how much they would hate this (ibid).” 
4.5 The Joint Statement 
As Prime Minister Singh arrived in Washington D.C. on July 18, 2005 negotiations continued 
even as President Bush and Prime Minister Singh met one-on-one in the Oval office. Essentially, 
India wanted the coveted status of an official NWS. One senior American official involved in the 
negotiations was quoted in the Washington Post: “They were really demanding that we recognize 
them as a nuclear weapons state. Thank God we said no to that, but they almost got it. The 
Indians were incredibly greedy that day. They were getting 99 percent of what they asked for and 
still they pushed for 100. (ibid)”30 
The U.S.-India Joint Statement avoided the term “nuclear weapons state” being included in the 
text. Instead, the Joint Statement said that India, as a “responsible state” with a demonstrated 
commitment to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, “should acquire the same 
benefits and advantages as other states with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United 
States “(White House 2005). In return, Prime Minister Singh pledged that India would “assume 
the same responsibilities and practices” aimed at preventing nuclear weapons proliferation as 
other countries with advanced nuclear technology (ibid.). As part of this commitment, India 
would: 
• allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its 
civilian nuclear facilities (military facilities, which would be separated from civilian 
facilities, would not be subject to inspection.); 
• negotiate an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 
• continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing; 
• strengthen safeguards on its nuclear arsenal; 
                                                 
 
30 In reality, however, the nuclear deal gives India a “de facto” recognition. This has been implicitly recognized even by U.S. 
Chief Negotiator Nicholas Burns who told reporters on March 2, 2006, that “India is a nuclear weapons power, and India will 
preserve part of its nuclear industry to service its nuclear weapons program.” See: White House (2006)  
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• negotiate in good faith for a future FMCT; 
• continue to adhere to self-imposed guidelines comparable to those of the NSG and 
Missile Technology Control Regime for exports of its own nuclear material and missile 
technology; and 
• allow American and other international companies to build nuclear reactors in India. 
(ibid.) 
President Bush, for his part, promised he would work to amend U.S. domestic laws and persuade 
the NSG to adjust their guidelines to permit nuclear trade with India. In addition, India would 
have to negotiate a separate safeguards-agreement with the IAEA.  
A bilateral working group started negotiating a separation plan of India’s nuclear programs in 
order to facilitate commerce within civilian nuclear energy. Although the negotiations were 
entering highly technical issues, the U.S. delegation was to be led by Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns: 
You had people with very entrenched non-proliferation standpoints. Bob Joseph 
[Chief of the Bureau of Non-proliferation]—where this should have rested—he 
had some real concerns. So Nicholas Burns was tagged to lead. (State Department 
official, interview 22.10.08) 
Presented in March 2006 during the President’s visit to India, the separation plan outlined that 14 
out of 22 facilities would be designated as civilian, and thus accessible to international 
inspectors. Eight military facilities would be off-limits for inspectors. Crucially, India was 
allowed to keep two fast-breeder reactors within its military program. This is important because 
the fast breeder reactors, when they become operational, can produce large quantities of 
weapons-grade plutonium (Einhorn 2006).  
4.6 Skeptical Democrats 
The critique from many non-proliferation specialists was harsh due to what they saw as overly 
generous U.S. concessions to India. Even a former non-proliferation official in the Bush 
administration, John Wolf, came forth saying: “It’s disappointing that we’ve given something to 
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India and not gotten something substantial in return.  This agreement is difficult to reconcile with 
the international norms advanced by the United States for the last 40 years” (Weisman 2005). 
Although it is difficult to estimate a ‘win-set’ of the possible preferences of the U.S. legislators 
in Congress who would have to give their stamp of approval to the agreement, it is not very 
controversial to say that the preferences of the President and his close advisors must have 
deviated from that of many, if not most legislators in Congress. As noted by a Republican 
congressman, Jim Leach, in a hearing in late 2005: 
I don’t know any member of Congress that doesn’t want to have a warming of 
relations with the government of India…I also don’t know many members of 
Congress who are pushing for the precise commitment that the administration has 
made (Kerr 2008:10).  
As the ratification process ran into problems, the vote on the nuclear agreement in Congress got 
delayed and took place in the fall of 2006.  By then, the congressional majority had shifted in 
favor of the opposition Democratic Party. Cultivating close ties to the arms control organizations 
that formed the backbone of the opposition against the nuclear agreement, the Democratic Party 
had traditionally been more inclined to support the policies put forth by Washington’s small, but 
vocal non-proliferation specialist community. 
Not constituting a coherent group of legislators, it is difficult to estimate the Democratic Party’s 
general preferences. The views of people like Strobe Talbott, who had negotiated with India on 
behalf of the Clinton-administration or Senator Sam Nunn, a long time non-proliferation 
stalwart, may give some clues however. Talbott (2005) claims that ever since India’s 1998 tests, 
the U.S. had secretly been exploring possibilities for what he calls “a genuine compromise” with 
India: “Such an agreement would give India more access to technology necessary for its civilian 
nuclear energy program in exchange for meaningful constraints on its weapon program, 
consistent with [India’s] own declared policy of wanting to have only a credible minimum 
deterrent. (ibid)” The Bush administration, Talbott claims, “departed from such a trade-off and 
granted India the privileges of a NPT member with very little in return.” (ibid.)  
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Talbott lamented:  
In one important respect, the Indians have received more leniency than the five 
established nuclear "haves" have asked for themselves: The US, Britain, France, 
Russia, and China say they have halted the production of the fissile material that 
goes into nuclear bombs, while India has only promised to join a universal ban 
that would include Pakistan — if such a thing ever materializes. Yet that pledge, 
in the future conditional tense, was apparently enough for the Bush administration 
(ibid.). 31 
As the nuclear deal would give India the ability to import uranium to feed its civilian nuclear 
program, Sam Nunn claimed that India would no longer, as before, be forced to divide limited 
domestic uranium resources between civilian and military purposes. In the absence of a 
moratorium in the production of fissile material, India could—because of the access to the 
international nuclear market—free up its domestic uranium resources to make more bombs.3233 
Furthermore, the permission granted to India to keep the fast-breeder reactors within the military 
program aggravated this problem and was amply criticized by Democrats in Congress (Haniffa 
2006e). 
In the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests, getting India to sign on to the CTBT had topped the U.S. 
wish list. Indeed, during the Singh-Talbott talks, Indian officials had hinted they were ready to 
sign on to the CTBT as a quid pro quo for an end to the old sanctions on its nuclear program 
(Crossette 1998; Mohan 2006:56).  As the U.S. Senate has yet to ratify the treaty, a CTBT-
signature would not be a realistic demand from the United States in its negotiations with India in 
any case. Yet, for some non-proliferation advocates within the Democratic Party, not using the 
nuclear agreement as a bargaining card to get India to join the CTBT, may have constituted a 
missed opportunity. 
                                                 
 
31 Negotiations on the envisaged FMCT have been stuck in the UN Conference on Disarmament for over a decade.  
32 The advantage this gives India and its nuclear weapons program has been openly acknowledged by Indian policymakers. 
See:.Subramanyam, K. (2005)  
33 Ashley Tellis, an advisor to the Bush administration, has downplayed the importance of this argument. Tellis holds that India’s 
current lack of domestic sources of uranium is due to a “lack of milling and mining capacity which is being corrected”. “The 
transient shortages of natural uranium”, he says, “could disappear within the next several years.” The implication, if Tellis is 
right, is that India would be able to increase its production of nuclear weapons in the future, regardless of the U.S.-India Civil 
Nuclear agreement. See: Tellis, Ashley  (2006b:10)  
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4.7 The acceptability-set of President Bush 
Provided that the assumption that the preferences of President Bush did not originally coincide 
with most legislators is right, one may ask what made his “acceptability-set“ so large as to 
accommodate India on questions where the administration was likely to meet stiff resistance 
from large parts of Congress? The Washington Post reported:  
U.S. officials said Bush had kept his focus on a core idea—that India is a thriving, 
pluralistic democracy, one of the good guys in international relations—and thus 
was willing to sweep away nuclear orthodoxy. The goal, an official said, was to 
position India to be one of the United States’ two or three closest partners. 
(Kessler 2006b)  
Some claim that the Bush-team originally had wanted to put more constraints on India’s nuclear 
weapons program, but essentially caved in to India’s demands (ibid.). Others hold that the 
bargaining outcome— which did not put restraints on India’s nuclear weapons program— was 
the one that was actually desired by the key players within the administration (see Perkovich 
forthcoming). A report written prior to the negotiations by Ashley Tellis (2005:25), one of the 
advisors of the Bush administration, lends credibility to the second explanation:  
By integrating India into the non-proliferation order at the cost of capping the size 
of its eventual nuclear deterrent [...] [the U.S. would] threaten to place New Delhi 
at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only 
undermine Indian security but also U.S. interests in Asia in the face of the 
prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term. 
Besides a simple classical “balance-of-power” rationale, there could also be business interests at 
stake. In selling the agreement to Congress, the potential the agreement could have as a door-
opener for U.S. contracts in the nuclear industry and other sectors such as defense and aviation 
was strongly emphasized (see chapter six). Furthermore, the new engagement with India could 
be something of a bright spot for an administration that was criticized for the troubles in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. A grand “Nixon to China” approach towards India could give the President a much 
wanted foreign policy victory important for his legacy.  
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4.8 The debate in India 
Even as non-proliferation experts characterized the U.S. bargaining as “Santa Claus negotiating” 
(Weisman 2006), what cannot be ignored in this equation is the preferences and power of the 
counterpart.  India, as any power that is strong and ascending rapidly, tends to pursue its interests 
with a “particular vigor and self-confidence” (Lodgaard forthcoming: 11). Clearly, the 
concessions that Talbott and the non-proliferation bureaucracy of President Bush had wanted to 
extract from India would have killed any prospects for overlapping ‘win-sets’. India, engaged in 
rivalry with both Pakistan and China, had made it clear early on that it would not accept any 
unilateral constraints on its nuclear arsenal (Kerr 2008:19). 
Over the course of the negotiations, India’s bargaining power was further enhanced by the 
domestic opposition to the agreement. An embattled Prime Minister Singh was held hostage to 
the opposition he faced from the Left Front, whose support he relied upon in parliament to stay 
in power. A particular concern for the Left Front was that the nuclear deal would make India’s 
foreign policy subservient to Washington. The resistance to the nuclear agreement from the BJP, 
the main opposition party to the UPA-coalition, was a bit more surprising. Indeed, when the BJP 
was in government, they too had been pressing the Bush administration for an end to the 
technology denial (Mohan 2006:23-25). As an article in Time put it: 
The BJP had also agitated vociferously against the deal, but many suspect that had 
the hawkish, U.S.-friendly BJP been in power, they would have more likely 
embraced the nuclear treaty. Cynical posturing is a fact of political life in an 
impoverished India where politicians pander to populist sentiment (Tharoor 
2007). 
Branding the ruling Singh-government as “soft” on national security may have constituted a 
welcoming opportunity for the BJP to divert attention from the continued internal problems after 
losing the 2004 elections (ibid.). Political opportunism or not, the BJP consistently maintained 
that the nuclear agreement would entail a negative impingement on India’s national security and 
sovereignty. These complaints became louder as the negotiations evolved, particularly as a result 
of the demands by the U.S. Congress for an abrupt cancellation of cooperation and withdrawal of 
equipment in the event India resumed nuclear testing. 
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4.9 Summary 
The radical reorientation of U.S. non-proliferation policy toward India was likely to meet stiff 
resistance from elements of the non-proliferation bureaucracy, the opposition Democratic Party 
and the community of non-proliferation specialists. To maintain autonomy from these potential 
spoilers, the Bush administration put emphasis on secrecy in the lead up to the first 
announcement of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. As the following chapters will make clear, this 
secrecy would cause much damage, particularly in the executive’s relations with Congress. 
Applying concepts from two-level theory tentatively, it can be said that President Bush’s 
‘acceptability-set’ was quite broad, broader than what many legislators in Congress probably 
appreciated.  To secure a successful domestic ratification of the endeavor, therefore, the Bush 
administration would have to build a strong domestic coalition in favor of the agreement and 
reach out to, amongst others, the Indian American community. 
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Chapter 5 
The Indian American community—a profile 
What attributes does the Indian American community have that could make this immigrant group 
a potent lobby?  What made it an attractive partner for both the Bush administration and the 
government of India in the ratification process of the nuclear agreement? These are the questions 
this chapter seeks to answer. First I will examine the financial, organizational and demographic 
characteristics of the Indian American minority. Thereafter, I will highlight the community’s ties 
to the Bush administration and the Indian government. 
5.1 Socio-economic profile 
The 2006 American Community Survey estimated that Indian American households had a 
median household income of $76.112, 58 percent higher than the average (U.S. Census Bureau 
2006). The percentage of Indian Americans aged 25 and older with a college degree (B.A. or 
higher) was estimated to be 67.3 percent compared to 27.0 percent among the general population 
(ibid). The achievements of Indian Americans are impressive, but also reflect a “brain drain” 
effect: the immigrants represented the “cream of the crop” back in their ancient homeland. 
Being high-achievers in the academic field, a disproportionate number of Indian-Americans are 
employed as lawyers, engineers, academics, financiers, and business-owners. There are 46,000 
doctors and another 15,000 Indian American medical students in the United States (AAPI 
2008).34  As of 2000, about 300,000 Indian Americans worked in technology firms in California 
(Embassy of India 2000). 57.7% of Indian-Americans in the workforce are employed as 
managers or professionals, reflecting the high entrepreneurial skills of Indian Americans 
(USINPAC 2008). Indian American hotel owners, who together own more than 20,000 hotels in 
the US, represent over 50% of lodging properties in the economy and own almost 40% of all 
hotel properties in the United States (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs 2007). A 2003 study by 
                                                 
 
34 President Obama appointed Dr.Sanjay Gupta, an Indian American CNN-reporter who is also an Assistant Professor of 
neurosurgery, as Surgeon General to head the U.S. Public Health Service. 
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Merill Lynch, a consultant firm, estimated that there were over 200,000 Indian Americans with 
assets worth a million dollars or more (Andersen 2006b; Kirk 2008). Considering that nearly all 
Indian American immigration has taken place after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, 
the achievements of the immigrant group represent, as one researcher has noted, “perhaps a 
record in U.S. social history” (Andersen 2006b).35 
5.1.1 Fund raising 
Strong economic achievements are also being translated into an increasing rate of donations from 
the community into political campaigns in the United States. In the 2002-2004 election cycle, the 
Indian American population donated an estimated $16 to 18 million U.S. dollars to political 
campaigns (Sharma 2004:9). The prime example is Piyush “Bobby” Jindal, who was elected first 
to Congress and then later as Governor of Louisiana. In his 2004 election campaign, Jindal was 
able to collect more than $2 million dollars from his fellow members of the Indian American 
community (ibid). 
During the 2008 presidential race, Indian Americans contributed significantly.36 At one Indian 
American fund raiser alone, held at the Sheraton Hotel in New York, 1,200 of the nation's most 
prominent Indian-Americans from all across the country flew in and raised around $2 million 
dollars for the Clinton campaign (Mcauliff & Kennedy 2007). A memo leaked from Obama's 
campaign staff described Hilary Clinton as the Democrat from Punjab, a region in India. The 
episode created sharp reactions within the Indian American community and Obama immediately 
apologized publicly in a letter to USINPAC (Kornblut 2007). 
5.2 Organizational unity and strength 
Financial resources may be a necessary, but not a sufficient basis for establishing an effective 
lobby. A book by a group of Indian-American scholars, written in 2001—characterized the 
                                                 
 
35 This 1965 law amendment opened up for greater immigration of foreign professionals, scientists and within certain professions 
with labor shortages.  
36 One news report quotes a source who estimates that Indian Americans donated around $ 5 million each to Barack Obama and 
Hillary Clinton, and half a million to John McCain during the primaries alone. No estimates were included of contributions to 
other candidates. See: Anburajan, Aswini (2008) 
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community as “seen rich, but unheard” (Khagram et al. 2001). A news article in the New York 
Times cited political analysts who claimed Indian Americans, in the past, had too often been 
“content with photo opportunities and lunch invitations with politicians rather than victories on 
issues like immigration or trade policies” (McIntire 2006). 
Organizationally, the Indian American community has been fragmented, with organizational 
segmentation along lingual, cultural and professional dimensions (Kirk 2008). One primary 
reason for these divisions has been the cleavages that can be seen within India at large. Some 
parts of the Indian American community have mobilized under the Hindu umbrella whereas 
others, more pluralistic groups have emerged that are explicitly anti-Hindutva (Kurien 2007:1). 
Moreover, personal rivalries have influenced both the internal dynamics, as well as relations 
between different Indian American organizations, presenting another obstacle to efforts to unify 
the community (ibid.). Indeed, former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee once reportedly 
complained, only half-jokingly, that there were more Indian organizations in the United States 
than there are Indian-Americans (Hathaway 2004). 
5.2.1 Organizational development 
Beginning with the 1990s, one witnessed the first emergence of national Indian American 
political action groups. These groups organized congressional internship programs for young 
Indian Americans and helped established an India caucus for lawmakers in Congress.37 One 
reason behind the political activism may be found in a generational convergence:  as the second 
generation of well-integrated Indian Americans became established in their careers, some began 
turning their organizational skills toward politics; the first generation-immigrants, meanwhile, 
were nearing retirement age, with greater leisure time and disposable income to pursue political 
interests (Kirk 2008:289). 
The last stage in the organizational maturity has been the establishment of professional lobby 
groups. The most prominent of these, the USINPAC, was formed in 2002 by Sanjay Puri, a 
                                                 
 
37 The Washington Leadership Program, (an internship program) seems to be bearing fruits. For example, today there are at any 
time more than 40 Indian American staffers working in the House and the Senate. Since its inception in 1994, a substantial 
number of young Indian Americans have gained internship experience. See: Andersen, Walter K. (2006b) 
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young IT-entrepreneur, who had been inspired by Jewish friends with experience from lobbyism 
(ibid:291). From a mere post box “office” USINPAC has expanded quickly and found its place 
in K-street at the heart of Washington’s lobby-industry. The staffers are mostly young Indian 
Americans with degrees from U.S. elite universities (ibid.). USINPAC now boasts a membership 
roster with some 60,000 members, a number that has increased rapidly because of the 
mobilization on the nuclear deal.38 Emulating the structure of the Jewish lobby, USINPAC has 
national outreach with 27 different chapters across the country (USINPAC 2008). 
The Jewish lobby has not only been a role model for USINPAC, the group has very actively 
collaborated with groups such as the American Jewish Committee on issues such as shaping 
legislation, arranging joint receptions for legislators, holding frequent seminars and even joint 
delegations to Israel and India (Hathaway 2004).39 As an example of the close cooperation, the 
American Jewish Committee threw its weight behind the effort to get the nuclear deal passed by 
writing letters to all members of Congress urging them to support the U.S.-India nuclear 
agreement (Ghoshroy 2006:3). “Some of those active in this collaboration argue that because 
both communities [Indian and Jewish] are highly educated, affluent and disproportionately 
represented in certain professions such as medicine, engineering, education and high-tech, they 
share tangible interests that extended beyond opposition to Islamic radicalism“ (Hathaway 2004). 
In spite of its calls for unity among all Indian Americans, the close alliance building USINPAC 
has had with Jewish organizations has at the same time led to accusations of a pro-Hindu or anti-
Muslim tilt of the organization (Hathaway 2004; Kurien 2007). 
5.2.2 International outreach 
USINPAC is not only active in the United States, but is also increasingly making their presence 
felt in the corridors of power in India. Indian Americans affiliated with USINPAC created the 
                                                 
 
38 These numbers are based on information from a personal interview with Sanjay Puri, Chairman of the USINPAC, and deviate 
from numbers referred to other places. This difference is according to Mr.Puri due to the different levels of membership that the 
organization offers.  
39 The close cooperation between the Indian and Jewish lobby goes much further back than the founding of USINPAC. For 
example, in the mid 1990s Ralph Nurnberger, a professional lobbyist for AIPAC was “headhunted” to become the Director of the 
India Abroad Center for Political Awareness, a position he held for 12 years where he helped establish inter alia the Washington 
Leadership Program for Indian Americans.  
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ImagIndia Institute, an increasingly influential “public diplomacy” think tank located in New 
Delhi.40 On the nuclear deal, apart from being very active pro-deal participants in the media 
debate, the ImagIndia Institute circulated a research paper to all members of Indian Parliament to 
explain the economic benefits of the agreement, which attempted to quantify the overall 
economic benefits flowing from the agreement (Sharma 2007). Moreover, at the 2008 annual 
Diaspora conference hosted by the government of India, the ImagIndia Institute coordinated 
efforts to recruit over a hundred overseas Indians residing in various countries to lobby their 
respective governments in order to gain approval of the nuclear agreement in the multilateral 
NSG (Guha 2008). 
5.2.3 The India caucus in the U.S. Congress  
You see the goodwill. You see the largest caucus in Congress. Someone has been 
pushing this, it’s not a coincidence.  (Sanjay Puri, interview 30.09.08) 
In the U.S. Congress there are a large number of ethnic caucuses, but perhaps as a sign of its 
importance, the India caucus is the biggest with 176 members in the House of Representatives 
and 40 members in the Senate (U.S.-India Friendship Net 2007). That constitutes nearly 40 
percent of all legislators in both chambers. The India caucus in the House was established 
already in 1993, largely in response to the very negative views towards India in Congress and the 
State Department, particularly on non-proliferation and its human rights policies in Kashmir.41 
The caucus, initiated by an organization called the Indian American Forum for Political 
Education, secured support from a few Congressmen from New Jersey, a state with one of the 
highest concentrations of Indian Americans. The mission was to “educate Congress members on 
issues concerning India, so that the Congress could in turn question the administration and 
influence policy” (Diwjani 2000). Hosting conferences, caucus days and events whenever there 
                                                 
 
40 Robinder Sachdev, President of the Imagindia Institute is a co-founder of USINPAC.  
41 In the 1990s, India was almost subjected to economic sanctions several times by the US Congress for perceived violations of 
civil rights in Jammu, Kashmir and Punjab. At one stage, New Delhi escaped economic sanctions being imposed by Congress by 
a margin of just three votes. In addition, one Congressman, Dan Burton, proposed “annual” amendments to slash all development 
assistance to India, many of which almost passed. See: Hathaway, Robert (2001:28)  
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are important visitors from India, the caucus serves as an institutionalized dialogue between 
Indian Americans and legislators (Gottschlich 2008). 
Robert Hathaway (2001:28) notes how Indian American publications like India Abroad gave 
extensive coverage of the caucus and “encouraged its readers to urge their congressional 
representatives to join…seeing no downside to enlisting in the caucus and sensing an easy way 
to please constituents, House members readily complied.” However, although described by some 
as a “cash cow” for campaign contributions, Indian American organizations increasingly expect 
something in return (Haniffa 2005).  USINPAC’s Sanjay Puri puts it this way: 
Also, this caucus, in many ways like it is used by many members, it is for fund 
raising. So you come to this caucus, and say, I like India, I support India, I like 
Indian Americans... and… then you vote against our issues, and then you ask us 
for contributions? No… So I think that, kind of, puts it black and white. If you are 
in this caucus, you’d better have a very good reason for voting against our issues. 
Otherwise, don’t join the caucus. (Interview 30.09.08) 
The “Friends of India” caucus, the first country-based caucus in the history of the Senate, was 
formed in 2004 after close involvement by the ambassador of India (BBC 2004). Perhaps as a 
sign of how well-connected the Indian American activists are, it was co-chaired by Hilary 
Clinton and enrolled both Senate majority and minority leaders. Though constituting a loosely 
connected grouping, several researchers have noted how the caucus has provided India with an 
“institutional base of support” in the U.S. Congress, important in raising the awareness about 
India and negating the influence of Pakistan (Hathaway 2001, 2004; Rubinoff 2005).   
5.2.4 The nuclear agreement: Bringing the community together 
“They're tripping all over each other to get behind this,” Gary Ackerman, a former India caucus 
chair noted of the Indian-American mobilization on the nuclear deal: "On a scale of 10, this is 
probably a 15 for them."(McIntire 2006).  Serving as a symbol of India’s position in the world 
and its relations with the United States, the nuclear agreement pressed a number of hot buttons 
that unified the community politically. 
The U.S.-India Friendship Council is a case in point. Comprising six different organizations, 
with influential organizations representing the hotel owners and doctors of Indian origin among 
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them, the grouping was formed as an ad-hoc umbrella organization for the purpose of pushing 
the nuclear agreement through Congress.42 As leader of the powerful grouping Swadesh 
Chatterjee points out, the enthusiasm was unprecedented: 
People were so generous when I raised the money. It took me only 24 hours to 
raise 1 million dollars. [...] They [the members] are personally very well-off and 
they believe very strongly in this cause. Quite a number of people did go and raise 
$60,000, a 100,000, 40,000, 10,000, depending on their capacity (interview 
16.10.08) 
5.3 Demographic factors: Geographic concentration and voter turn out 
Currently growing at an annual rate of 10.5 percent, the size of the Indian American community 
is expanding rapidly (USINPAC 2007). A remarkable number of up to 90 per cent of registered 
Indian American voters participate in elections, which should make the community an influential 
voting block (Gottschlich 2008: 2).  However, there are two major limitations: First, close to 1 
million Indian Americans don’t have a U.S. citizenship, according to the estimates from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2006). The vast majority of the Indian Diaspora in the United States arrived 
sometime during the last 20 years. Thus, the number of people eligible to vote becomes 
markedly reduced. Indian Americans increasing influence in U.S. politics is therefore more due 
to their position as a “donor machine” rather than as a “voter machine”. 













                                                 
 
42 The organizations that were brought under this “umbrella group” were:  The Association of Indians in America (AIA), Indian 
American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE), National Federation of Indian Associations (NFIA), the Global Organization 
of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO), American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI), and Asian American Hotel 
Owners Association (AAHOA). 
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43 The U.S. Census Bureau makes annual estimates, but the decennial count is the only comprehensive overview. The last was 
held in 2000. 
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Second, the community is relatively dispersed geographically. Although there are certain 
regional concentrations of Indian Americans in California, Chicago, Detroit, Houston and the 
New York metropolitan area, the settlement pattern of Indian Americans, according to one 
researcher, “resembles the average American population to an astonishing degree” (Gottschlich 
2006:18).44 Contrary to assumptions in the literature on ethnic interest groups, Andersen 
(2006b) claims that this dispersal works to the benefit of the Indian American community; 
because of its wealth and organizational skills it can give Indian Americans a broad impact 
across the country. 
5.4 Ties to the motherland 
Political activism among Indian Americans predates the attention it has received in recent years 
from the Indian government. Indeed, in official language referred to as Non-Residential Indians 
(NRI’s), Indian Americans and others from the over 20 million large Diaspora were in the past 
often dubbed “not-required Indians” (The Economist 2003). When the BJP came to power, 
however, this started changing. The Indian government initiated a High Level Commission on 
the Indian Diaspora. The report of the Commission highlighted how the Diaspora could be both a 
political and economic asset to India (see Government of India 2002).45  
Following the recommendations of the report, a Ministry of Overseas Affairs was established 
exclusively f to reach out to Indians living abroad. Moreover, the report prompted the 
government to permit Indians living abroad dual citizenship. The Ministry of Overseas Affairs, 
which hosts annual “Diaspora conferences” addressed by the Prime Minister, helps keep a 
constant focus on how India can reap the benefits of its “extended” nation abroad (Mohan 2003). 
                                                 
 
44 Kirk (2008) actually claims Indian Americans largely fulfill the criteria of “geographic concentration”. He does not, however, 
encounter much support of this claim from other researchers such as Andersen (2006b) and Gottschlich (2006).The only 
statistical evidence the author could find is referred in figure 8.1 and, in a comparative perspective with other ethnic groups, it 
would indicate that Indian Americans are fairly dispersed group.   
45 In response to the earthquake that hit India’s Gujarat state in 2001, the American India Foundation (AIF) was founded by 
influential Indian Americans, reportedly at the urging of former President Bill Clinton (who serves as the foundation’s chair).  
The AIF has raised more than $35 million in its first five years of existence, fighting water scarcity, thereby making the 
community a philanthropic force. See: Kamdar, Mira (2008:10)   
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The economic reasons for Mother India to reach out to its Diaspora are obvious.46 India is now 
the world’s top destination for remittances. Of an estimated $27 billion that migrants send home, 
44% come from North America (Patnaik 2008). Remittances still account for three times the size 
of all foreign direct investments (FDI) into India, but following the example of China, the Indian 
government is in the process of easing restrictions to attract more FDI from its Diaspora (Zhu 
2007). 
The potential “political assets” that a large Diaspora can bring has also been recognized by top 
policymakers. In the words of former BJP minister of External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha, Indian 
Americans are an “extremely important source of support for the Indian Government in the 
execution of its policies through the influence and respect they command” (Mohan 2003). The 
particular attention given to the Indian American community is also demonstrated in the way the 
Indian government has dispatched its own “NRI-ambassador” to the United States, to work 
exclusively on engagement with the Indian American community (Kamdar 2004:342).  
 
With regards to the nuclear deal, Indian American community groups, though denying in any 
way being directed by the government of India, consulted with their representatives on how to 
lobby Congress (McIntire 2006).  A diplomatic representative of India in Washington D.C. 
confirmed having contact with the Indian American interest groups, but pointed out that there is 
nothing abnormal with an embassy keeping in close touch with its Diaspora abroad, saying: “We 
have meetings with them, they have meetings with us. It’s a pretty intensive engagement” 
(Interview 26.10.08). 
5.5. Ties to the Bush administration  
The value of having the Indian American community lobby Congress on the nuclear deal was not 
missed by the Bush administration either. Invited Indian American groups received “training” by 
the State Department in non-proliferation issues to better lobby Congress. According to  
                                                 
 
46 An article in the New York Times cites a report by McKinsey & Company which found that the Indian Diaspora generates an 
annual income equal to 35 percent of India’s GDP. See Waldman, Amy (2003) 
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USINPAC’s Sanjay Puri: 
I would say we had pretty significant contact [with the Bush administration] 
because they wanted to make sure that this got through Congress. We are not 
experts on thorium and uranium. So to make sure we were educated, that the 
thousands of Indian Americans that we had put up on the street, nobody of these 
knew the difference between IAEA and NSG, we said, you know, we need to 
know when we talk to lawmakers. Most of us are not nuclear engineers or 
scientists. What we care about is the relationship (interview 30.09.08) 
The close contact with the executive was also confirmed by Swadesh Chatterjee, who noted: 
“One meeting we had at the White House, we met Karl Rove. Then we had quite a number of 
meetings with the State Department and conference calls with the White House” (Interview 
16.10.08).”  Chatterjee led a delegation of no less than 200 Indian American community leaders 
to the White House in May 2006, besides attending “victory celebrations” in 2006 and 2008. The 
meetings with the State Department included briefings by top officials such as U.S. Chief 
Negotiator Nicholas Burns and Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Richard 
Boucher. In addition, through the conference calls with the White House, Indian American 
groups were kept constantly updated and encouraged to lobby Congress (Haniffa 2006a; 
Krishnaswami 2008).47  
5.6 Summary  
Indian American political activism has been building quietly for some time and predates any 
close involvement with government representatives from the U.S. and India. The nuclear deal, 
however, can be understood as the catalyst that has paved the way for a consolidation of this 
ethnic lobby (Kirk 2008). The close ties established with state actors in India and the United 
States gave the lobby access to information which in turn enhanced the community’s ability to 
lobby legislators.  
                                                 
 
47 Unrelated to the nuclear deal, but perhaps as a sign of its close contact with the Bush-presidency, influential Indian Americans 
are actually permitted to hold an annual Diwali-party at the White House. Originally arranged through personal acquaintances to 
the President, it has now become a tradition. See: Haniffa, Aziz (2006g)  
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The Indian American community displays both strong organizational skills and financial wealth. 
Demographic factors (being a geographically dispersed group that does not make up a very 
strong voting block) should theoretically limit Indian Americans’ scope of influence. It could be, 
however, that this geographical dispersal actually works to the advantage of the community, 
given the organizational skills and the financial wealth that the group exhibits. 
The India caucus in both houses of Congress represents an interesting construction: For sure, at 
least among Indian Americans, it has created an expectation of support from legislators on issues 
that are important to them, such as the nuclear deal was. Indian American groups, it seems, have 
become more assertive and increasingly want something in return after generous contributions to 
legislators, not only lunch and photo opportunities. 
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Chapter 6: 
Congress: From Skepticism to Landslide Approval 
When President Bush announced the initiative in 2005, the reaction on Capitol 
Hill was one of complete surprise. That is because the administration gave 
absolutely zero forewarning to Congress. So there was surprise and skepticism, 
even among Republicans. 
(Interview, Congressional staffer I, 14.10.08 ) 
The joint statement President Bush and Prime Minister Singh had presented in July 2005 
represented no fixed agreement, but rather the basic framework of such a deal. Joe Biden, the 
highest ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, characterized the 
initiative as a “gamble” (Tate 2005). Even usually reliable allies of the Bush administration such 
as Republican Senator Richard Lugar expressed concern that the U.S.-India nuclear deal would 
undermine the NPT (McIntire 2006). This chapter tracks the nuclear agreement’s passage 
through Congress from the hearings that were held on the matter in the fall of 2005—which 
reflected considerable congressional skepticism—to the agreement’s eventual landslide approval 
in 2006 and 2008. 
6.1 Bush presents a bill 
The Bush administration, eager to get early approval, formally introduced a bill in March 2006, 
without even having completed a finalized nuclear agreement with India.48 The administration’s 
bill would essentially have authorized a future agreement with India—leaving the final terms in 
considerable part to the U.S. and Indian governments to negotiate—without any requirement for 
final approval of the agreement by Congress (Weiss 2007:439). The administration’s bill even 
                                                 
 
48 By March 2006, the administration had finalized negotiations with India over a separation plan for India’s nuclear facilities. 
The negotiations of a formal agreement specifying the technical details of the agreement, a 123-agreement, still awaited. 
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allowed the president extended authority to waive all sanctions, endowed in the Atomic Energy 
Act, that would result from an Indian nuclear test (ibid).49 
Both the Republican and the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives made it 
clear that they did not necessarily support the legislation, even as they agreed to introduce the 
bill to Congress (Brinkley 2006).  As a reporter from Time described the situation: 
Even though it is too early to tell whether opponents will build enough 
momentum to block the landmark agreement, what's already striking is how 
silent—and unenthusiastic—Congress seems over an agreement the Bush 
Administration hails as critical for cementing a strategic alliance with the world's 
largest democracy (Waller 2006). 
When the Bush administration presented its bill, the New York Times reported a bipartisan 
scepticism on Capitol Hill and an emerging “alliance of conservative Republicans, who are 
concerned that the [nuclear] deal will encourage Iranian intransigence, and liberal Democrats, 
who charge that the Bush administration has effectively scrapped the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty” (Weisman 2006). 
6.1.1 The Bush administration makes its case 
The Bush administration stressed how the nuclear agreement would lay the foundation for a 
strategic partnership with India, a rising global power, for the 21st century. The administration 
claimed this strategic vision could not be fully realized, unless the nuclear “irritant”, which had 
complicated efforts to improve bilateral relations over the last 30 years, could be removed once 
and for all. Rice also warned Congress in hearings that if the deal got defeated or altered in any 
fundamental way, “all the hostility and suspicion of the past would be redoubled” between the 
two countries (Rice 2006:6). 
                                                 
 
49 Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Hyde commented:"[T]he original Bill was conceived in a 
profoundly unsatisfactory manner in several aspects. It would have granted the administration an unprecedented and sweeping 
freedom of action by waiving almost wholesale the existing laws regarding civil nuclear commerce with foreign countries, even 
as it reduced the role of Congress to a bare minimum. In effect, Congress was being asked to remove itself from the process 
entirely and abandon its constitutional role." See: Ramachandran,R.(2006) 
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Second, the administration pointed out how the initiative would enhance India’s energy security. 
Civil nuclear energy cooperation would limit India’s demand for fossil fuels and thereby also 
ease pressure on global energy markets and be in the U.S. self interest. Third, nuclear energy was 
presented as a way for India to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gasses, shifting India’s 
demand for energy away from burning coal, which today accounts for around 50 percent of 
India’s total use of energy (ibid.).  
Fourth, the Secretary of State emphasized how the agreement would create new opportunities for 
American businesses, particularly, but not exclusively in the nuclear sector.  In her testimony on 
the nuclear deal, Rice also pointed to corporations like Boeing, Intel and Microsoft and their 
expansion into the Indian market. Indeed, Rice even went so far as to say: "At its core, our 
initiative with India is not simply a government-to-government effort. It was crafted with the 
private sector firmly in mind” (ibid: 10). 
Finally, countering the claims of the non-proliferation lobby, the Bush administration claimed 
the civil nuclear agreement represented a “net gain” for non-proliferation efforts, a claim which 
was boosted when IAEA-boss Mohamed El-Baradei expressed support of the agreement (El-
Baradei 2006). Moreover, it was emphasized that India had a good non-proliferation record of 
not exporting nuclear secrets or material. Additionally, India’s acceptance of safeguards on its 
civilian nuclear program, representing a total 65% of all its reactors, would imply much greater 
IAEA oversight and safety than without an agreement. “We are better off having India most of 
the way in, rather than all the way out”, Rice stated, claiming that the agreement would bring 
India closer to the NPT-mainstream (Rice 2006: 11).  
6.2 What did critics say? 
The streams of critique followed multiple paths. Many pointed to the potentially dangerous 
precedence the agreement could bring. A key complaint was that U.S. non-proliferation policy 
had become “more self-serving, and less principled”. The fear was that the non-proliferation 
rules the U.S. had initiated and championed through the NPT would be perceived as less binding 
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and more optional to member states. According to this argument, “Russia and China would feel 
less inhibited about engaging in nuclear cooperation that the U.S. might find risky and 
objectionable with special friends of their own – Iran and Pakistan” (Einhorn 2005). 50 
Marking a major departure from the “country-neutral” norms that for decades had defined the 
regime, the U.S.-India nuclear agreement was also seen by many as undermining what was the 
basic bargain of the NPT—which obligates signatories to the treaty to forswear nuclear weapon 
ambitions in exchange for peaceful civil nuclear cooperation. What signals would it send out to 
other signatories of the NPT when India was given access to civil technology and the ability to 
keep its weapons, indeed even the possibility to expand its production of fissile material to make 
more nuclear weapons? Critics complained this could complicate the case against Iran: Indeed, 
why should Iran be punished on mere suspicion of weapons intent when India, a non-member—
condemned as a “nuclear pariah” less than ten years earlier—now could “have its cake and eat it 
too”? 
Many arms control experts claimed the Bush administration should have bargained harder, and 
that India—in order to deserve the deal—should have taken on more non-proliferation 
obligations (Einhorn 2005). As pointed out by Sandy Spector (Council on Foreign Relations 
2008), a non-proliferation expert: 
When you go down the list of elements of the deal, and then you ask, "What are 
we getting for ending this embargo?" there isn’t very much.  India's agreed to 
continue its moratorium on nuclear testing. That's fine, but they were doing that 
already. They've agreed to adopt export controls. That's fine, but that's already 
required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540. They've agreed to place 
certain civilian facilities under inspection. That's nice, but they're not going to 
allow inspections of a large group of other facilities. This group includes all of the 
facilities contributing directly to India’s nuclear weapon program. So from the 
inspection standpoint you don't get much. 
Apart from the focus on non-proliferation, there were also claims that the Bush administration 
had exaggerated the benefits of the deal. Ashton B. Carter (2007), a former official in the 
                                                 
 
50 Almost immediately after the U.S.-India nuclear agreement was passed in October 2008, China agreed to sell Pakistan nuclear 
reactors. See: International Herald Tribune (2008)  
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Clinton-administration, summarized some of the critiques of the Bush administration’s 
arguments: 
 
What did the United States get for its gift to the Indians? The Bush administration 
initially made some over-the-top claims—for example, that nuclear commerce 
with India would be big business for the much-shrunken U.S. nuclear industry and 
that nuclear power would significantly blunt India's impact on the global oil 
market and the environment. In fact, Russian, French, and other foreign firms 
might benefit most from liberalized nuclear trade with India. And nuclear power 
will not fuel India's cars and trucks; oil will. Nor will nuclear power stop the 
growth of polluting coal burning, which is needed to meet India's increasing 
electricity demand. Some of the Bush administration's arguments seem to have 
been made in a desperate attempt to claim a rare foreign policy victory. The 
benefit sought by most Americans who favored the India deal was a "strategic 
partnership": the important but elusive long-term goal of having India—a 
democratic, multicultural, strategically located state—as a new partner for the 
United States. But there is little evidence so far that India's policies across the 
board have changed in favor of the United States.51  
6.2.1 The question of Iran 
Carter’s words, describing the nuclear agreement as a “gift” to India is quite instructive for the 
American debate. Rightly or wrongly, a perception held by many in Congress was that the 
agreement was asymmetric, that India was given a de facto nuclear weapon power status and 
access to the international nuclear market upfront in exchange for what was seen as highly 
moderate non-proliferation concessions and insecure strategic gains for the United States. These 
gains would be contingent on India’s future behavior.  
India’s good relations with Iran, a close partner through the non-aligned movement, had hardly 
played a major role in U.S.-India relations until September 2005 when they became politicized 
after India’s foreign minister, Natwar Singh, made public remarks supportive of Iran’s position 
on the nuclear issue (Fair 2007:146). Members from across the political spectrum in Congress 
                                                 
 
51 As an example, in the fall of 2006, India participated at a meeting organized by the Non-Aligned Movement in Havanna. 
Among the guests, apart from Prime Minister Singh, was Hugo Chavez and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. One 
analyst referred to the content of the meeting as “thumping anti-American”. See Carter, Ashton (2007)  
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made it clear that India’s failure to side with the U.S. on the Iran nuclear issue would jeopardize 
any congressional support for the nuclear deal (ibid.). 
India eventually voted against Iran in the IAEA later in September 2005 and February 2006. The 
second of these votes recommended that Iran be referred to the UN Security Council for 
violating international obligations. Mr.Singh’s government, which also came under pressure 
from the U.S. to abandon a pipeline-project with Iran, was accused by the opposition of 
betraying a friendly country by “capitulating” to U.S. pressure. 
Moreover, press reports of Iranian naval ships visiting India’s Kochi port for “training” appeared 
right before congressional hearings on the nuclear agreement in March 2006. The Bush 
administration, under heavy questioning first denied the exercise took place and then dismissed it 
as exaggerated (ibid: 146). Other Congressional reports revealed Indian transfers of heavy-water 
and chemical-related technology transfers to Teheran (Kronstadt 2006:4).  In July, just days after 
the House of Representatives held its vote on the nuclear agreement, the State Department 
released an intelligence report, much delayed, which made clear that two Indian firms had 
provided Iran with missile technology (Linzer 2006).  Critics asserted the report was delayed for 
tactical reasons (ibid). 
6.3 The “India Lobby” at Play 
After the nuclear cooperation plans were announced, media reports were quite critical and the 
Bush administration was forced on to the defensive. Speaking about the initial response to the 
nuclear initiative among legislators, Swadesh Chatterjee, leader of the Indian American 
Friendship Council, claimed the agreement was “dead on arrival” in Congress (interview 
19.10.08).  Sanjay Puri, Chairman of the USINPAC, also emphasized how many lawmakers 
voiced strong concerns about the NPT-regime. However, Puri also highlighted how many 
lawmakers had little prior knowledge of what the civil nuclear initiative was about: “You can’t 
expect every member of Congress to be informed about all issues.  So, a large part of our job was 
to educate them (interview 30.09.08).”  Yet, as he also points out:  “Then you had many 
traditional friends of India, who we knew we could count on, [who] said yes, it is time India is 
taken out of this nuclear isolation (ibid.).” 
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Not all of India’s traditional friends on Capitol Hill were forthcoming, however. When a dozen 
members of the India caucus, predominantly Democrats, came out against the agreement, it 
created calls in the Indian American press for “tougher admission standards” to the caucus 
(Krishnaswami 2006). Newspapers and journals established for the Indian American community, 
like India Abroad and News India, carried a constant stream of articles explaining the bill and 
reporting on who had — and who had not — expressed public support. “Behind this reporting 
was a not-so-subtle message that those opposing the bill might lose the vote—and the money —
of the Indian American community in their constituencies” (Andersen 2006b). 
The Indian American Friendship Council sponsored several adds in newspapers around the 
country, including full-page color advertisements in the Washington Post, to urge fellow Indian 
Americans to support the agreement.  Indian American groups, the New York Times reported, 
were “organizing fund-raisers and blanketing Capitol Hill with briefings, phone calls and 
petitions” (McIntire 2006).52 As Swadesh Chatterjee points out: 
Our goal was to let Congressmen and Senators know that the whole Indian 
American community is behind this [...] We bombardized Congressmen with 
thousands of letters and e-mails. We had signature-campaigns, letters from all 
across the country with hundreds of names. We jammed their fax machines 
(Interview 16.10). 
On May 3 2006, over 200 Indian American community leaders from all across the U.S. went 
door to door to their respective Congressmen and Senators to press for the nuclear deal after a 
meeting at the White House (Haniffa 2006a).  
Before that, there were only five sponsors of the bill, after this event in 
Washington it went from five to ten to fifteen so that in the end we had 45 co-
sponsors of the bill. The ball started moving and everybody came and joined to 
support it. (Chatterjee, interview, 16.10). 
16 out of the 45 original co-sponsors who publicly backed the U.S.-India deal were from Texas, 
a fact largely attributed to the intense lobbying from the very active Indian American community 
                                                 
 
52 USINPAC organized no less than 17 fund-raisers on Capitol Hill from January to June 2006. See: Forsythe, Michael & Veena 
Trehan (2006)  
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leaders there (Andersen 2006b). Indian American community leaders in Texas had counterparts 
in every state with a significant Indian American population (ibid.) “A lot of people don’t 
understand this. This was a domestic issue, not only a foreign policy issue”, USINPAC’s Sanjay 
Puri points out (Interview 30.09.08). 
6.4 The two-step process 
After a proposal by congressman Tom Lantos in May 2006, a two-step legislative process that 
would delay a final vote was adopted. First, Congress would vote on the principle of making a 
“unique exception” allowing for nuclear trade with India, a non-NPT member. The bill would 
simultaneously hammer out the conditions under which Congress would consider this exception. 
If this was accepted, the executive would have to negotiate the final, technical aspects of the 
nuclear agreement with India and achieve approval from the IAEA and NSG before the bill 
could come back to Congress for a final up or down vote. Accordingly, when the Senate and 
House produced their own bills, sanctions that would result from an Indian nuclear test were 
retained (Weiss 2007:439).  In the next couple of weeks and months that followed, lobbying 
efforts for and against the agreement grew in intensity. 
6.5 Persistence, stamina and financial muscles 
The first voting on the nuclear deal was announced to be held in June and July 2006 through the 
Foreign Relations Committees of the House and the Senate. In the lead up to the votes, Senator 
Barack Obama —one of the members on the Senate Committee, commented: “there appears to 
be a very coordinated effort to have every Indian-American person that I know contact me” 
(Forsythe & Trehan 2006).  The persistence and stamina of the Indian American groups was a 
very notable feature.  Swadesh Chatterjee elaborates:  
I personally had to go to my Congressman eight times, and after the fourth time, 
he said, Ok, I will support it, you are my friend, I will do it for you. I said no, I 
don’t want you to do it for me, I want you to do it because you believe in this 
(interview 16.10.08). 
The lobbying efforts of the Indian American community were sometimes very direct. Ramesh 
Kapur, a high ranking member of the Democratic Party, who attended the two Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee conferences in California and New York in the lead up to 
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the 2006 fall elections, privately told then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi that Indian 
Americans were “watching the deal” (Kirk 2008:295). Kapur’s message was reinforced when 
some 95 percent of the New York meeting’s fund-raising target was met by Indian-Americans 
alone (ibid.) 
Daryl Kimball, leader of the Arms Association, a non-proliferation advocacy group heading the 
campaign against the agreement, highlighted some of the efforts of his opponents in the Indian 
American lobby: 
I could just mention one thing that I’m aware of, I didn’t spend as much time to 
find out about all this, but you know, the campaign record shows that a guy 
named Ken Ajars, who was a wealthy Indian American, hosted a fund raiser for 
Joe Biden, on June 30 2006, which was about two days after the Senate Foreign 
Relations committee held its vote on the version of what was to become the Hyde 
Act. At that event 30 000 dollars were raised for Joe Biden’s re-election 
campaign. I’m sure that happened in other cases too… (Interview 15.10.08). 
Even though the views of vocal non-proliferation advocates was frequently reported in the news 
media, as Perkovich (forthcoming:13) observes; “they[non-proliferation groups] were unable to 
mobilize financial contributions or blocks of potential election votes to compete with the Indian 
Diaspora and business communities for congressional favor.” 
6.6 The killer amendments 
After key Democratic Senators, such as Joe Biden, came out in favor of the agreement and the 
preliminary vote in both the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees had indicated 
an ample majority in favor of the agreement, it became clear that the real battle would be not 
over whether or not the agreement would get the nod, but over the amendments that Congress 
would attach to the deal.53 
The sensitivity of the nuclear question in India meant the concrete wording of the legislation 
would be of crucial importance. Pointing to the strong domestic opposition at home, India’s 
                                                 
 
53 The nuclear agreement passed with an overwhelming 37-5 in the House Foreign Relations Committee and 15-2 in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. 
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Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran made it clear on a trip to the United States that “any amendments 
will kill the deal” (Bidwai 2006). A large segment of Congress, nonetheless, was unhappy and 
wanted to attach more conditions. At one point, rumors said the number of potential  ”killer 
amendments” could number eighteen (Haniffa 2006b). The U.S.-India Friendship Council, 
knowing the stakes were high, sent out “SOS” messages to congressmen, imploring them to 
reject any amendments (Haniffa 2006c).    
In the House of Representatives, at least three “killer amendments” that could have scuppered 
the agreement were defeated.  An amendment by Representative Howard Berman requiring the 
United States to withhold transfers of fuel until India ceases fissile material production for 
weapons lost by 241-185. Another amendment which would have the U.S. audit India’s fissile 
material stock annually was rejected by a 268-155 margin. The one overwhelming issue, 
however, was India’s relationship to Iran.  A third amendment, offered by Ed Markey, tried 
explicitly to link India’s support for the U.S. non-proliferation campaign against Iran as a 
binding condition to be included in the agreement. The amendment was defeated 235-192.  
A similar amendment was proposed in the Senate. Senator Barbara Boxer introduced an 
amendment which would set a ban on all military-to-military contact between India and Iran as a 
pre-condition to the agreement. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 59 to 38 votes. Joe 
Biden, the chair proceeding over the debate, who had come out in active support of the 
agreement, told the media he was positively “surprised” by the extent of support against the 
Boxer-amendment (Haniffa 2008d). 
After hearings in April and May, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee considered bills in late June 2006 that would provide an exception 
for India from certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act related to the signing of a peaceful 
nuclear cooperation agreement. On July 26, 2006, the House passed its version of the legislation 
by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate approved a similar bill by a vote of 85 
to 12. 
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6.7 Back to the negotiating table 
The Hyde Act, in spite of the defeat of the “killer amendments” in the U.S. Congress, came 
under heavy critique in India. The final 123-agreement, that was to spell out the technical details 
of the bilateral nuclear cooperation therefore required hard negotiations over a period of months 
during the spring of 2007.54 The Bush administration could not ignore the specific elements of 
law written into the Hyde Act pertaining to a mandated cut-off and the right of return of 
transferred items and materials in the case of an Indian nuclear detonation. Prime Minister Singh, 
meanwhile, was under heavy domestic pressure from the opposition right-wingers who claimed 
such provisions put India’s nuclear sovereignty in peril. The text of the 123-agreement, therefore, 
was rather vague on the issue of the consequences that would follow an Indian nuclear test 
(Lodgaard forthcoming:10). 
The release of the text of the finalized 123-agreement did not silence critics in India. Opponents 
continued to make reference to sections of the Hyde Act which they opposed. Statements from 
Stephen Rademaker, a former Bush administration official, which suggested that India’s anti-
Iran votes at the IAEA had indeed been coerced, reinforced perceptions in India of “hidden 
costs” attached to the deal (Varadarajan 2007). Not willing to risk early elections at this point, 
Prime Minister Singh called his counterpart President Bush in late October 2007 to inform him 
that the agreement would be put on hold until domestic consensus could be achieved in India 
(Page 2007). 
6.7.1 Indian Americans lobby in India 
Against the prospect of a collapse of the agreement, several Indian American groups dispatched 
delegations to strengthen the pro-deal lobbying in India. USINPAC, being one of them, sent a 
ten-member delegation to meet with Prime Minister Singh, the leadership of BJP and the Left 
Front. Prime Minister Singh reportedly asked the group to try to influence the opposition, whilst 
the media highlighted how Indian Americans were involved in the shuttle diplomacy between the 
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government and the opposition (Mitra 2007; The Hindu 2007). Asked about the role of 
USINPAC in lobbying in India, Sanjay Puri responded: 
We go often to India, a lot of Indian Americans do. In USINPAC we specifically 
take delegations of influential people in the sense they have done a lot for this 
[U.S.-India] relationship. We have access to the political leadership in India too. 
We were able to explain to the leadership, in many cases how the Americans felt 
and how they also need to understand the other side’s point of view. So we were 
able to do that because we are part of the system, we are kind of like a bridge. But 
once, in one delegation, we had to ask what the hell is going on?  We, in 
USINPAC, are representing 60,000 Indian Americans who are neither nuclear 
scientists nor engineers, but doctors, IT-people, taking time off from their work, 
to push this (Interview 30.09.08). 
USINPAC and other Indian American organizations made no secret of their disappointment at 
the BJP’s stance on the deal. Given that the BJP is widely believed to have tapped significant 
donations from the Diaspora, particularly in the U.S., its stance on the nuclear deal may have 
come at a price.55 Apart from a few defectors, however, the BJP did not change its official 
position the nuclear deal. Swadesh Chatterjee and the U.S.-India Friendship Council lobbied 
fervently, among others, the ruling Communist Party leaders in West-Bengal, and were thought 
to have made a “little dent” on the uncompromising stance of the Communists (Haniffa 2007a). 
After heavy pressure from the Singh-government, the Left Front-coalition gave a reluctant nod to 
allow the government to negotiate a separate safeguards agreement with the IAEA, one of 
several major steps needed to implement the deal. The Left Front issued the threat, however, that 
any further steps, beyond opening negotiations with the IAEA, could not be taken without the 
support of the Left Front. Should the government go further, the Left Front threatened it would 
withdraw its support for the Singh-coalition in parliament and thus cause it to fall. 
After the IAEA-agreement was negotiated in May, the nuclear agreement was again put on hold 
until the Singh-government decided to go ahead in July 2008, regardless of the furious 
                                                 
 
55 Rubinoff (2005:183) claims the Indian American community has become a magnet for politicians engaged in fundraising for 
electoral campaigns in India. Though data on this is difficult to find, it is widely believed that the BJP through its affiliate groups, 
such as the Vatan Hitkari Party and the Overseas Friends of BJP, has been especially active among the expatriate community in 
the United States (ibid.).  
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opposition from the Left. As promised, the Left Front moved to withdraw their support for the 
Congress-dominated government and called for a vote of no-confidence in parliament. Prime 
Minister Singh convinced the Samajwadi Party, a regional party from Uttar Pradesh which had 
previously argued strongly against the nuclear agreement, to change its position on the nuclear 
deal, essentially in exchange for electoral cooperation with the Congress Party in that state. That 
was sufficient to tip the balance and to save the government in the Indian parliament, and thereby 
also the fate of the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement.  
6.8 Back to Congress in a hurry 
After securing approval from the NSG in the beginning of September 2008, the nuclear 
agreement came back to Congress on September 10. The Bush administration, even as it was 
keen to seal a foreign policy victory before it went out of office, faced significant hurdles to do 
so. Lawmakers’ attention had been diverted to deal with the growing financial crisis. Another 
problem was the procedural hurdles. The Senate’s complex rules meant that even a single senator 
could interfere with the necessary “unanimous consent” needed to put the deal to a vote. (Kerr 
2008:6).  
To put the deal on “fast track”, Howard Berman, now chair of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee had to be persuaded. Berman had been highly critical of the Hyde Act in 2006.  
Would the Democrats, controlling both houses of Congress deny President George Bush a 
foreign policy victory at the end of his term? News media in India reported how the White House 
“roped in the Indian American community to influence reluctant senators” (Kumar 2008).  
It is learnt that the administration reached out to a small group of powerful 
members of the Indian American community through a conference call. From the 
administration side, the conference call had the participation of senior officials of 
the White House, the National Security Council and the State Department. One of 
the things that the administration conveyed to the community leaders is the 
imperative to start reaching out to Congressional leaders in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate very similar to the lines that had been done in the 
run up to the passage of the Hyde Act in 2006 (Krishnaswami 2008). 
Following a dinner at the residence of the Indian ambassador, a core group of two dozen Indian 
American community activists under the leadership of Swadesh Chatterjee met with Under 
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Secretary of State, Bill Burns, for a briefing, and later with the U.S.-India Business Council to 
strategize on how to lobby Congress (Haniffa 2008c).  Community activists all across the 
country were advised to contact their congressional representatives in order to get the deal passed 
(ibid.). 
In the end, none of the reluctant Senators decided to oppose the bill coming up for a vote. On 
“overtime”, as Congress was busy with the bail-out plan to rescue financial markets, both 
chambers of Congress passed the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement with a vote of 86-12 in the 
Senate and 298-117 in the House of Representatives. 
6.9 Summary 
In the United States, a widely held perception was that the nuclear agreement provided 
asymmetric benefits to India. This led to efforts from the U.S. Congress to “rebalance” the 
agreement. A number of amendments were offered which sought to condition the deal on India’s 
policy toward Iran or India accepting more non-proliferation obligations. This was seen in New 
Delhi as U.S. attempts to “change the goalposts” from those which had been agreed upon in the 
Joint Statement of 2005. The pressure, particularly from the U.S. Congress, reverberated and 
created a domestic backlash in India, thus reducing India’s ‘win-set’. These developments meant 
the agreement balanced on a razor-thin line in order to achieve overlapping ‘win-sets’. 
Indian American groups were active both in the United States and India. Their relative 
importance and the extent to which they mattered in the U.S. ratification process, is the theme for 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: 
Did they matter? 
How was it possible to achieve ratification— through a Congress controlled by Democrats— of 
an agreement representing such a dramatic departure from previous non-proliferation policy? 
Where, when and how could the Indian American community have an impact?  Corresponding 
with my second research question in the introductory chapter, this chapter seeks to assess the role 
of the Indian American community in the ratification process in the United States.  As any 
evaluation of the impact of the Indian American groups’ risks being heavily exaggerated without 
a consideration of other pull-factors, I start this chapter by presenting four alternative 
explanations (two different strategies of the Bush-administration, procedural rules and the role of 
other lobbyists) behind Congress’s ratification of the agreement before I turn to the efforts of the 
Indian American community.56 
7.1 The “strategy of secrecy” created a fait accompli 
At least a part of the explanation as to how this dramatic U.S. policy shift became possible has to 
take into account the tactical strategies applied by the Bush-team to carry it out. It kept potential 
spoilers both from within the non-proliferation bureaucracy and Congress out of the process 
leading up to the first announcement of the deal in 2005. These constituents would probably have 
demanded concessions from India that would have been unacceptable to the latter.  Once 
announced, the agreement with India was difficult to undo. The substantive issue, India having 
nuclear weapons wasn’t going to change anyway—and past policy hadn’t worked to change that 
                                                 
 
56 Three of the explanations I present here, correspond with Andersen (2006b): “What happened to turn this widespread 
skepticism into trust? First was the judicious White House decision to support a modification of the draft bill to give the Congress 
a role in the implementation of the deal that was missing in its original version. Second the supporters were quite effective in 
convincing members of Congress that the strategic gains outweighed the risks to nuclear non-proliferation. Third and perhaps 
most important, was vigorous lobbying, especially the efforts of the increasingly influential Indian-American community.” 
Andersen’s first explanation corresponds to my “procedural rules”, the second would seem to be in line with what I term the 
Bush-administration’s strategy of issue-linkage (One of the two strategies I consider), and like Andersen, I evaluate the  
explanation— “lobbying”—including other actors than just the Indian American community. 
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fact. Moreover, India was gaining importance in the global political spectrum. An outright 
rejection or attempts to change the fundamentals of the deal, the Bush-team maintained, would 
be a major setback for bilateral relations and too costly. The Bush administration, by its “strategy 
of secrecy”, had effectively created a fait accompli. A statement from Joe Biden may be 
instructive: 
The Administration did not consult us as it negotiated the July 18 Joint Statement 
between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh.  It paid little attention to our 
concerns as it negotiated with India regarding India’s plan for separating its civil 
nuclear facilities from its military ones.  And it submitted a legislative proposal to 
us and a decision proposal to the Nuclear Suppliers Group that were so poorly 
drafted as to cast doubt on the Administration’s seriousness of purpose. Despite 
this, I indicated three weeks ago that I will probably support the agreement at the 
end of the day. I did so because I agree that the time has come to develop a new 
relationship between India and the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.  And I did so also because undoing this deal could do more damage – in 
terms of our relationship with India – than approving it with carefully drafted 
conditions (Biden 2006). 
7.2 Successful issue-linkage: economics and geopolitics  
Another effective strategy employed by the administration was issue-linkage. Abandoning 
decades old principles of the NPT wouldn’t be a very popular thing to do, thus linking it to more 
popular issues was essential. The administration sold the nuclear agreement as a symbolic 
centerpiece that would bring Indian-American relations up to another level where “economic 
relations, defense relations, a whole range of relationships, including business relationships, will 
flourish” (Rice 2008).  One official in the State Department put it this way: 
At some point this stopped being about civil nuclear energy. India is seen as the 
next big, untapped market. This was what should blaze the path for other things 
(Interview, State Department official, 22.10.08). 
Framing the nuclear deal as the agreement as one that would “unlock the door” and yield vast 
long-term geopolitical and economic gains proved to be successful. Rapidly ascending India, a 
democracy situated between Pakistan and China, is an important partner both in the war on 
terrorism and for creating a strategically stable Asia. However, the Bush administration was 
careful, at least in its public rhetoric, not to frame the U.S.-India agreement as a containment 
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policy toward China, but as Ghoshroy (2006:1) points out: “many in the Congress were not so 
reticent.” 
7.3 Procedural rules 
Another factor that eased the American ratification of the U.S.-India nuclear agreement was the 
decision to adopt a two-step ratification procedure. The bill the Bush administration introduced 
for ratification in March 2006 had, as two Council on Foreign Relations scholars wrote at the 
time, “put Congress in the seemingly impossible bind of choosing between approving the deal 
and damaging nuclear non-proliferation or rejecting the deal and thus setting back an important 
strategic relationship” (Levi & Ferguson 2006:13).   The importance of the procedural rules for 
the successful outcome was underscored by one congressional staffer: 
The explanation why the vote was so large on it was that it [the Hyde Act] had 
something for everyone. It enabled those who were mainly concerned about non-
proliferation to vote to set the conditions of the things they wanted to see. It also 
allowed the people who wanted to be very pro-India to vote for the principle of 
expanding nuclear trade with India.[...] The form of the Hyde Act, with the two-
step process, reassured everyone sufficiently (Interview, Congressional staffer II, 
23.10.08).  
An important part of legislators’ initial antagonism toward the nuclear deal lay in the way the 
agreement had been negotiated and subsequently presented for congressional approval. The two-
step legislative process, which the Bush administration eventually accepted, reinstated 
congressional authority and reconciled some of the differences between the legislature and the 
executive branch. 
7.4 Other lobbyists 
Indian American groups, though important, were far from the only lobbying actors working for 
the deal’s passage. The Indian government, for its part, signed a contract worth $1.3million with 
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, a professional lobby firm with a former Bush appointee and 
ambassador to India, Robert D. Blackwill, on its payroll (McIntire 2006). 
The powerful U.S.-India Business Council was advocating the commercial benefits of the deal, 
particularly—but not exclusively—on behalf of the nuclear industry. Representing some 300 
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firms with business interests in India, the group had many important clients. One congressional 
staffer said: 
Well, there was lobbying, but frankly, the lobbyists didn’t do very much. They 
weren’t very effective in my opinion. The most effective were probably several 
individuals and business groups. The U.S.- India Business Council was out there, 
and they probably had some effect on people who were, who didn’t know very 
much or were insecure about the whole thing.  They were probably the most 
effective… 
(…) There were all sorts of Indian groups trying to take credit. I don’t think they 
deserve it. I think that there was some individual lobbying by significant Indian 
Americans when the agreement came up to specific members of Congress, but in 
terms of organized efforts…the Indians weren’t very organized in their lobbying 
efforts and I don’t think they had much impact (Interview Congressional staffer 
II, 23.10.08). 
Many analysts ascribe far more importance to the lobbying of interest groups in the 
ratification process on the nuclear deal than the statement from this congressional staffer 
would indicate. Just as the efforts of the Indian American lobby are frequently 
mentioned, a number of articles give equal attention to the push by the civil nuclear 
industry and defense sector in order to explain the landslide vote in Congress (Ghoshroy 
2006; Weiss 2007).  
7.5 Reservations 
The geopolitical rationale of the U.S.-India agreement is quite obvious. Systemic theories about 
international politics, with their tendency to diminish the role of domestic factors and indeed to 
treat states as “black-boxes”, may give parsimonious explanations for foreign policy outcomes. 
But should systemic imperatives behind states’ actions discourage scholars from looking inside 
the “black boxes”? 
Scholars of integrative approaches such as two-level theory think not. As Evans (1993:397) 
points out: “International bargains are not simply about relations between nations. They are also 
about the distribution of costs and benefits among domestic groups and about domestic opinion 
divided on the best way of relating to the external environment.” Opponents of the U.S.-India 
nuclear agreement, as one analyst points out, “came dangerously close to setting the terms of the 
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debate” (Andersen 2006b). Indeed, many non-proliferation specialists warned that the agreement 
would be a “pandora’s box”, which could have many unintended effects on the global non-
proliferation regime. Giving India a deal with the possibility to increase its nuclear weapons 
production, while at the same time trying to uphold global norms against proliferation, could 
make the U.S. seem ever more like the priest preaching temperance from a bar stool.  
Moreover, in order to effectively employ a strategy of “issue-linkage”, it must be noted that the 
Bush administration’s own goodwill on Capitol Hill was limited. Attempts to almost remove 
Congress entirely from the process had antagonized legislators from both parties. Thus, the 
administration may have needed “carriers” of its message. To reach out to the Indian American 
community was, as I have argued, very much a part of the administration’s strategy.  
This also reveals a problem with the different explanatory factors highlighted here. The 
geopolitical and economic benefits of the agreement were stressed by both the administration, 
and the Indian American lobbyists. A somewhat similar problem may arise from an explanation 
that emphasizes “other lobbyists”; for example; this thesis has focused on the ethnic Indian 
American lobby. One may ask if it makes sense to distinguish groups that are exclusively Indian 
American from other groups where ethnic Indians make up a substantial part of the membership. 
Not only is the U.S.-India Business Council, with membership from all over corporate America, 
chaired by an Indian American; the U.S.-India Business Council cooperated actively and co-
hosted several events with Indian American groups under the joint banner “Coalition for a 
partnership with India” (Haniffa 2008c).57 
Second, and therefore related to this, it may be pertinent to ask if the lobby by a group like the 
U.S.-India Business Council could somehow diminish the role of the Indian Americans in the 
process. Ron Somers, President of the U.S.-India Business Council, specifically pointed to the 
Indian American mobilization as the “main reason” why the enabling legislation to facilitate the  
US-India civilian nuclear deal was approved so overwhelmingly by both the House and Senate 
(Haniffa 2007b). In any case, a notable part of the rise of the Indian American as a political 
                                                 
 
57 Chairman of the board of the U.S.-India Business Council is Indra K. Nooy, an Indian American who is also CEO of Pepsi-
Cola. Note also that the group has an Executive President, different from the Chairman. 
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force,  is this seemingly successful alliance building that the immigrant group has been doing not 
only with the Israel lobby (as noted in chapter five), but with corporate America, of which Indian 
Americans form an ever more important part. 
7.6 Did the Indian Americans matter? If so how, where and when? 
Two-level theory, at its most basic level, holds that the possibility as well as the content of 
international accords is jointly determined by domestic and international factors (Evans 1993: 
397).  How did Indian American groups influence the possibility of the U.S.-India nuclear 
agreement getting passed? 
 
What would not be an overstatement, it seems, is that the Indian American community played a 
role in shaping the momentum for the deal. One congressional staffer was very impressed by the 
community’s lobby campaign:   
It has been called their coming out party. Even though they represent a significant 
minority, up until now, they haven’t really exerted their political power if you 
will. And this deal kind of served as their symbol to support better U.S.-India 
relations. And so we saw a huge outpouring of the Indian American community 
and a significant amount of lobbying from that community to members of 
Congress, which I think had a huge impact. (Interview, Congressional staffer I, 
14.10.08)  
Asked when he thought Indian Americans had had an impact, the staffer responded: “Early on in 
the process, they were really flexing their muscles (ibid.) 
Still, in retrospect, and considering the wide margin on the vote in favour of the agreement, it 
seems likely that the agreement would have passed through Congress even without the Indian 
American lobbying efforts. One close observer, Robert Hathaway, doubted claims put forth by 
many Indian Americans that the agreement was “dead on arrival” in Congress: 
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I know that much of the Indian American press claimed the agreement was dead. 
It ran into a lot of trouble, it was clumsily handled, but the agreement was never 
dead. Bush had defined it as an important issue, for that reason alone he could 
expect the support of at least 80 percent of Republicans, many of whom in any 
event don’t feel an allegiance to the NPT. On the Democratic side there was a lot 
more skepticism, but I had a feeling even back in 2006 that Bush could count on 
getting a substantial number of Democrats too. A large number of Democrats had 
identified themselves as friends of India by joining the India caucus. Now, that 
alone isn’t going to define how you vote, but in addition, you had the business 
community which was strongly in favor of this, so I don’t think the agreement 
was ever dead. (Interview, 16.10.08) 
Given that 115 out of 176 members of the India caucus in the House of Representatives are 
Democrats and that the Democratic Party has a tradition for cultivating close ties to the 
community of non-proliferation specialists, many legislators were put in a cross-pressure 
situation.  Co-chair of the India caucus, Congressman Joe Wilson acknowledged that the margin 
on the vote was “much better than expected”(Haniffa 2006f). This fact he attributed to the 
Indian American community. 
It really did reflect on something I knew would be important, and that is that the 
Indian American community is very well respected and by contacting their 
members of Congress and that was the first advise that I gave, that Indian 
Americans needed to meet with their members of Congress and express how 
supportive they were; This was the result of their efforts (ibid.) 
7.6.1 Getting overlapping ‘win-sets’ 
Even if there is very good reason to doubt the claim that Indian Americans somehow 
singlehandedly “staved off defeat”, another related question may be posed as to how the 
agreement passed and the conditions that were attached to the deal in the U.S. ratification 
process. Could the Indian American lobby effort in any way influence the content of the 
agreement? 
Two-level theory, which holds that ‘win-sets’ of parties to an agreement need to overlap for a 
deal to be successfully consummated, can illustrate this point. Prime Minister Singh was “boxed 
in” by domestic opponents to the agreement, thus the Indian ‘win-set’ was very small. This made 
the continued survival of the agreement extremely sensitive to changes in its content. In the 
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United States, meanwhile, due to the radical departure from past non-proliferation policy, there 
were several attempts to amend the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. 
Despite this pressure for amendments, in the end Congress added only a few conditions to the 
deal in the final bill—most of them non-binding on India (Carter 2007). Had the amendments 
been included that, for example proposed to make an agreement contingent on India’s production 
of fissile material or policy on Iran (as a binding obligation)—as many in Congress actually 
wanted—it may well be that the agreement would have collapsed due to opposition in India. 
To conclude that the Congressional rejection of these amendments was due to the frenetic 
lobbying of the Indian American community, however, is ultimately nothing more than 
speculation. Nevertheless, it can be noted that Swadesh Chatterjee and Daryl Kimball, lobby 
representatives for opposing sides on the nuclear agreement, both attributed the defeat of the 
killer amendments partly to the efforts of the Indian American community. 
Whenever we have charited in the last two years, we kept every chip we had for 
this cause. So that people who were against it, all the killer amendments, none of 
them could pass because of our follow-up. We did not convince them with our 
pocket book, but with the hard-arguments that we had. (Interview Chatterjee, 
16.10.08) 
Similarly, perhaps somewhat less predictable, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Association argued: 
Members of Congress, I think, at a certain point became fearful of taking actions 
that offended the Indian American community. The perception is that the 
community is wealthy and powerful, and that they [Congressmen] may loose 
votes or campaign contributions. [...] Even if there weren’t campaign 
contributions to a particular candidate, that member of Congress became fearful 
of the possibility that Indian Americans would penalize them for voting no or 
offering killer amendments” (Interview, 15.10.08). 
7.6.2 Helping to hand Bush a victory before he left? 
The agreement’s long hold-up in India meant that that when Prime Minister Singh survived the 
vote of no-confidence in July, it would be a race against time to assure that the bill got passed  
during President Bush’s tenure. The Bush administration was keen to land the nuclear 
agreement, deemed as important to its foreign policy legacy, while still in office:  
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The bill was introduced to Congress with 13 days left on the congressional 
calendar. For us to get a committee hearing and then a vote, an actual floor vote, it 
amazed even us. Passage this quickly can probably be attributed directly to the 
Indian American community. Their mobilization was key, that’s where the extra 
push had to come from. I don’t think it could have happened without a mobilized 
constituency. 
Two-three days before the Congress recess, you’re in a lame duck session. So you 
had a sort of obscure civil nuclear agreement with India and a bill all about saving 
our financial markets and they dealt with the India bill first! (U.S. State 
Department official, interview 22.10.08) 
While it may be a puzzle why Democrats would be in a hurry to give President Bush a foreign 
policy victory, it must also be pointed out that there may have been a sense of “commercial 
urgency” and push from the nuclear industry not to be at a comparative disadvantage as India, 
after the green light from the NSG, was free to negotiate contracts with other supplier countries 
such as France and Russia. 
7.7 Concluding remarks 
I started this chapter by looking into alternative explanations as to why Congress ratified the 
nuclear agreement. The strategies of the Bush administration (both tactical-- one emphasizing 
secrecy and another issue-linkage particularly to strategic gains), procedural (the two-step 
process) and the lobbying from other business groups (explaining the economic benefits) were 
all important to increase the U.S. ‘win-set’ size. Seen jointly or separate of each other, these 
explanations would suggest that the role of the Indian American mobilization was not as decisive 
as some researchers and Indian American leaders themselves portend. 
Nevertheless, based on data from interviews and different media statements, I found three 
different stages in the process where Indian Americans could have played a role, though the 
extent to which they did so is difficult to estimate.  Indian Americans seem to have played an 
important part in creating a momentum early on in the ratification process by demonstrating their 
strong support to members of Congress. Moreover, the Indian American lobbying may have 
played a role in defeating the “killer amendments” – which was essential because these 
conditions that Congress wanted to attach had the potential to derail the whole agreement. Last, 
but not least, Indian American mobilization could have been a central factor in getting the 
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agreement up for a vote during the lame duck session in 2008, thereby handing the Bush 
administration the foreign policy victory it had longed for. 
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Chapter 8: 
The rise of Indian Americans as a political force—
why is it important? 
Under what scope conditions could the Indian American immigrant group emerge as an actor on 
foreign policy matters? How can the role of these politically mobilized interest groups be 
understood within a two-level framework? This chapter seeks to give some concluding remarks 
on my findings relevant to the research questions (i) and (iii) in the introductory chapter. 
Towards the end of the chapter, I will point to future, potential fields of research that may flow 
out of this thesis. 
8.1 The New Kids on the Block? 
In a 2002 overview of ethnic interest groups in the United States, James Lindsay, a former Vice-
President of the Brookings Institution, tipped that Indian Americans would emerge as a political 
powerhouse: 
One [immigrant group] likely to be active in coming years is Indians.  Not only 
does India face military threats—from both Pakistan and China—but Indian 
Americans are one of the most affluent ethnic groups in the United States.  They 
have become active in politics, contributing an estimated $8 million to federal 
election campaigns over the last three elections.  Congress has taken notice… 
(…) Not only are they [Indian-Americans] affluent and interested in India, but 
China’s rising power and India’s decision to move toward a market economy 
means their calls for a more “India friendly” foreign policy are likely to meet a 
receptive audience in Washington (Lindsay 2002: 38-39). 
With the massive mobilization on the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement, Lindsay’s predictions 
about the Indian American immigrant group are showing signs of materializing. Lindsay’s quote 
above also demonstrates the favorable domestic and international context that has facilitated the 
empowerment of Indian Americans. The peculiarities of the American political system leave a 
space for ethnic interest groups to rise, especially if such groups exhibit certain financial, 
organizational and demographic characteristics. What lessons can be drawn from the case of the 
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Indian American lobby? Can a “success formula” for the empowerment of ethnic interest groups 
be found?  
8.2 Analogies to other cases: Ethnic interest groups and the national interest 
As noted, the timing of the “coming out party” of Indian Americans corresponds with what 
seems like an emerging, broader U.S.-Indian strategic alignment. In the literature, ethnic interest 
groups are widely tipped to be more successful in getting “Uncle Sam’s ear” when the policies 
they advance coincide with broader strategic U.S. aims. Securing U.S. support for the security of 
a lone democracy in the Middle East, as has been the aim of Jewish Americans, or fighting the 
communist Castro-regime, as is the case of Cuban Americans, also seem to be cases that dovetail 
well with U.S. strategic priorities.  
Nevertheless, to treat the “national interest” as a given can be problematic too. As is evident by 
the critique of Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), both seasoned neo-realists; the Israel lobby may 
over the years have acquired such power that it can influence U.S. policy to significantly deviate 
from what (at least in the view of the authors) “the national interest” is or should be. Similarly, 
the Cuban lobby is often blamed for contributing to the upholding of sanctions against 
communist-Cuba, which according to many within the U.S. business sector represents a Cold 
War anachronism (Donohue 2000; Haney & Vanderbush 2005). A possible interpretation of this 
may be that ethnic lobbies emerge and grow strong when structural patterns in the international 
system allow for them to do so. Over time, however, these ethnic lobbies could acquire a power 
that helps to reinforce the very structural tendencies that helped their emergence. Sometimes, as 
the examples of the Israeli and Cuban lobbies could indicate, they even help policies that by 
most standards should be passé, to remain in place.  
8.2.1 Getting the right mix: ethnic interest group attributes  
To be in “sync” with broader international, structural tendencies may be a necessary, though not 
a sufficient condition for a strong ethnic interest group to emerge. In an overview of American 
ethnic groups, Indian Americans were ranked as having the highest socio-economic status and 
education level of all groups (Jews included, note the statistic resemblance --table 8.1 below). 
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Figure 8.1: Data on selected ethnic groups in the United States. Source: Grossman, Matt (2005:19)58 
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In a measure of “geographic concentration”, however, the Indian American community came out 
in the lower end of the scale, with Cubans being number one in this characteristic. 
Geographically quite dispersed and not (yet) constituting a very strong voting block, this is a 
factor that may make the Indian American community distinct from other groups that have 
                                                 
 
58Table entries are based on pooled General Social Survey (GSS) data. The first two columns measure the difference between the 
group mean and the overall mean. The final column measures the geographic concentration of these groups. The findings related 
to the different ethnic groups in Grossman’s study must be treated with some caution. The “populations” representing the 
different groups in the survey are of different size, making the margin of error somewhat larger among the groups with a small N. 
See: Grossman, Matt (2005)  
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established prominent ethnic lobbies. It could be, however, that strong financial and 
organizational muscles outweigh this “demographic” weakness. Another interpretation, though 
one cannot generalize from one single case, would be that whereas votes matter for the power of 
ethnic interest groups, financial clout matters more. 
While material power could be one factor behind the empowerment of Indian Americans as a 
political force, another and easily forgotten factor is indeed that of the community’s strong 
intellectual capacity. Highly educated, the group may not only have the political muscles, but 
indeed the “brain muscles” not only to care about politics, but also to participate with a respected 
and articulate voice. 
Indeed, Indian Americans have for quite some time had ambitions to gain a political influence 
commensurate to their high achievements in fields like business, science and the media. To win a 
political clout, it seems, was also matter of pride to many community leaders, sort of like that 
one last step up the ladder to status and recognition in their new, adopted American home.59 This 
goes right into the “agency versus structure” debate. Two things must be pointed out. The 
emergence of the Indian American lobby has been helped by a general geopolitical 
rapprochement between the United States and India. Second, and in extension of this, the 
lobbying from the community was surely encouraged and helped by the consultation and 
“information-sharing” with both the Bush administration and the Indian government. 
Nevertheless, activism within the community has been building for years, so that when their 
influence was called for, Indian Americans saw the nuclear deal as their chance to show they 
“had come of age”—ready to “come out and party”.  
                                                 
 
59 To understand how Indian Americans have acquired this image of notorious high-achievers, take a look at this list: Rono Dutta 
was the president of United Airlines, Rakesh Gangwal is former president and CEO of U.S. Airways, Rajat Gupta is managing 
director of consulting giant McKinsey & Co. Or they have founded companies of their own: Sabeer Bhathia is founder of 
hotmail, Vinod Khosla the founder of Sun Microsystems, Vinod Dham is the founder of the Pentium-processor. Other famous 
Indian Americans include Fareed Zakaria, Jagdish Bhagwati as well as several Nobel Laureates.  
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8.2.2 The importance of “role models”  
The Jewish lobby, already for decades established as the quintessential ethnic lobby in the 
United States, is frequently looked upon as a model for other groups to emulate. Apart from 
using the Jewish lobby as a role model, a very notable feature of the Indian American 
mobilization, particularly represented through USINPAC, has been its very active collaboration 
with Jewish groups. This phenomenon, in the literature sometimes referred to as “alliance 
building”, bears resemblance to other cases of ethnic interest group empowerment. In the 1980s, 
AIPAC reportedly trained staff of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) “in tactics 
for transforming a foreign policy issue into a domestic one that would be susceptible to interest 
group pressure” (Haney & Vanderbush 1999:349). Similarly, Ambrosio (2002b) describes how 
Jewish groups have collaborated with Turkish American organizations. 
Still, it must be noted, this close “alliance” with the Jewish lobby still represents an asymmetric 
relationship where Indian Americans—particularly through the network of USINPAC— are the 
junior partner. The strength of the Jewish lobby is unparalleled, as demonstrated by its fund-
raising ability.60 The Indian American fund-raising potential is beyond doubt, but hitherto it 
seems that the bulk of it is channeled through specific Indian American wings of the Democratic 
and Republican parties, not as much through USINPAC and other interest groups per se.61  A 
very notable feature of the Jewish fund-raising is how much of it that is channeled through their 
organized interest groups, thus maximizing the influence of these organizations (Mearsheimer & 
Walt: 156).62 The organizational apparatus of Indian Americans, by comparison, is characterized 
more by an ad-hoc, “grassroot” mobilization, as exemplified through the U.S.-India Friendship 
Council. Nevertheless, efforts to build a stronger organizational infrastructure are underway. 
                                                 
 
60 The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic presidential candidates “depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much 
as 60 percent of the money raised from private sources.” See: Edsall & Cooperman 2003. Other estimates are lower, but 
contributions from Jewish Americans form a substantial share—between 20 and 50 percent –of the contributions made to the 
Democratic Party and its presidential candidates See: Mearsheimer & Walt 2007:163. 
61 From 2003-2006, USINPAC donated more than one million dollars to congressional campaigns. See: Andersen, Walter 
(2006b).  
62 The Economist (2007) estimated that pro-Israel interest groups raised $57 million from 1990-2004 for congressional 
campaigns. 
  85 
 
Highlighting the Israel lobby as a model, leader of USINPAC, Sanjay Puri, maintains that “It’s 
pointless to reinvent the wheel” (Hathaway 2004).  
The strong political activism has long been underway within the Indian American community. 
The internship programs and the size of the India caucus, currently the largest in the U.S. 
Congress, are signs of how active the community has been in trying to build its presence on 
Capitol Hill. Although previously quite fragmented, the nuclear agreement helped to unify the 
community into two strong organizations. Unity on this cause proved to be a success. If the 
organizational infrastructure and network is left intact, as seems likely, the Indian American 
political machine is available for future mobilization. Ray Vickery, a former Assistant Secretary 
for Commerce who worked as a lobbyist on behalf of the U.S.-India Business Council, expects 
the community’s political power to grow in years ahead: 
The nuclear matter has brought the Indian American community together as never 
before. As you probably know, with many of these Indian American organizations 
there has been tremendous infighting, tremendous divisions within the 
organization. The civil nuclear issue brought them together and I believe they will 
be more united in the future. They are interested in having across the board 
political influence equivalent to that of the Jewish Americans in regard to Israel, 
and I think that is probably going to come about…  
(…) The Indian American community is the fastest growing ethnic community in 
the nation, they are growing faster than Latinos on a percentage basis. Indian 
Americans have the highest per capita income of any ethnic group in the United 
States and they are learning to combine policy with their resource and fund 
raising potential. I think that augurs well for their future… (Interview, 24.10.08).  
8.3 Diaspora groups—and two-level theory 
I have argued that the two-level framework is a useful starting point to conceptualize the role of 
ethnic interest groups. The literature on ethnic lobbies highlights how Diasporas relate to their 
“homelands” and “host countries”: as noted, ethnic interest groups can interact with two-sets of 
state actors and can be players on two “domestic tables”.  An Indian diplomatic representative 
pointed to how Indian Americans have been important in the recent rapprochement between the 
U.S. and India: 
  86 
 
Indian Americans surely have played a role. This role is at two different levels. 
One, by their daily lives, they have in a sense showcased the entrepreneurial, 
technological skills of India, which has drawn many ventures into India. The 
second is, the community has expanded, today it counts 2.7 million, it is very 
prosperous, it has a high level of achievement. They have been able to reach out 
to the political leadership in the United States. That is an autonomous 
development, they have made people familiar with what is the best India has to 
offer.  
 
(…) At a political level, as their [Indian American] leadership has matured, they 
have gotten more organized and been able to reach out to the leadership not only 
in the U.S., but in India. They act as a bridge. [...] In India they have reached out 
to the leadership of all the political parties, to explain, to garner support for 
bilateral initiatives, like now with Civil Nuclear agreement (Interview 26.10.08). 
The way Indian Americans are having an impact around the respective “domestic tables”, as the 
quote from the Indian diplomatic representative demonstrates, may have an indirect, “soft 
power” element and a more tangible, “political power” component . In the following I will 
elaborate on these two. 
8.3.1 A new kind of ”soft power”—but for whom?  
C.Raja Mohan, an influential academic and journalist, has branded the Diaspora as India’s 
biggest instrument of “soft power”—that is, “the ability to influence other societies through such 
real but intangible elements as culture and values” (Mohan 2003). Hard power, the traditional 
currency in international relations, may demonstrate a country’s ability to get the outcomes it 
wants through inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”). “Soft power”, on the other hand, is 
the power of attraction—it is about “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” (Nye 
2004:5). The end result, ideally, is a more favorable public opinion and credibility abroad (ibid.). 
Thus, soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of other people, not through 
coercion but through co-option. 
Indian Americans, typified by physicians and Silicon Valley computer technicians have, as 
Rubinoff (2005:169) notes, strongly contributed to changing the image of India in the United 
States: “In the time span of a single generation the image of Indians, in the United States and the 
subcontinent, has been transformed from a malnourished skeleton in a filthy dhoti to a highly 
educated prosperous professional in a designer business suit”. 
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But the potential “soft-power” impact of the Indian American community can also be of help to 
the United States. Indian Americans have played a major role in transforming the face of the 
Indian society by infusing new ideas—formally or informally—as well as economic, human, and 
social capital from the United States (Rubinoff 2005; Waldman 2004). 
 





In addition to the estimated 2.7 million strong Indian American community, on an annual basis 
about 100,000 Indians are granted H-1B visas, a temporary work-permit for specialized 
occupations (see figure 8.2).63 Of these many stay on in the U.S., but an increasing number have 
started to return home—frequently employed in businesses engaged in the outsourcing of 
services and with vested interests in good bilateral relations (Waldman 2004).64 The 
entrepreneurial success of Indian Americans has also influenced Indian policymakers as they 
undertake economic reforms, a reality acknowledged by Prime Minister and former Finance 
Minister Manmohan Singh (Rubinoff 2005:170). The almost 80,000 students from India in the 
United States now make up the biggest group of foreign students in the country, a number that is 
                                                 
 
63 H-1B-visa is a non-immigrant, temporary visa that allows U.S. employers to employ foreign guest workers in occupations 
requiring highly specialized knowledge and the attainment of a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent at the minimum. The duration 
of stay of a H-1B Visas is 3 years, extendable to six.  See: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2005) 
64 By one estimate, there are 35,000 returned NRI’s working in the high-tech sector in Bangalore. See: Waldman, Amy (2004) 
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still growing by a high percentage every year.65 It is estimated that sixty percent of retired Indian 
generals have children studying abroad—over half of them in the United States (ibid: 178). 
 
The United States remains “the land of opportunity” for Indians. Asked where they would 
recommend that a young person move in order to lead a good life, a 38% plurality of Indians 
choose the United States (Pew Research Center 2006). These numbers were the highest of all 
the 17 countries polled; in none of the other countries did even a plurality recommend the U.S. to 
the hypothetical young person searching for a better life (ibid.). 
 
Figure 8.3 Data collected from Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2005 (see Pew Research Center 2006) 
 
Indeed, the Pew Global Attitudes survey found that about seven-in-ten Indians (71%) have a 
favorable view of the United States. Of all the countries polled in the survey, only Americans 
themselves held a more favorable view of the U.S., its people and foreign policy (ibid.).  While 
these findings cannot be attributed to the highly successful Indian Diaspora in the U.S. alone, it 
may well be one important contributing factor. 
                                                 
 
65 Of 123,000 Indians studying abroad, 76,000 of them are at universities in the United States. See: White, Andrew (2007)  
  89 
 
8.3.2 A political weapon, but for whom?  
Indian Americans serve as a stable reservoir of support for an India-friendly foreign policy in 
Washington. Though it is hard to prove their exact effect on the nuclear agreement, it is entirely 
possible that India in the end could get a better deal with the defeat of the killer amendments, in 
part thanks to the efforts of their Diaspora. In this regard, Indian American interest groups can be 
seen as a “potent political weapon” for India (cf. Walt 2005).  A well-known columnist and 
editor of the Times of India, Swaminathan S.A Aiyar (2002), expects Indian Americans to be of 
enormous diplomatic value to New Delhi in the future: 
If 100,000 Indians per year enter henceforth on H1-B visas, I suspect four-fifths 
will stay on in the US and bring over an additional four relatives each. If so, in 10 
years the US will have over 5 million Indian Americans, most in positions of 
power and influence. They will constitute a stronger foreign policy tool than 
anything Indian diplomats can devise. 
Even so, to put the tag “agents” of New Delhi on the Indian American interest groups (cf. Walt 
2005) is not entirely accurate either. Although Indian Americans generally work for an “India-
friendly” U.S. foreign policy, on the nuclear deal the Indian American groups “tended to evince a 
keener appreciation for how accommodative of Indian interests the U.S. already has been, 
whereas Indian government officials remained more uncompromising with respect to certain 
aspects of the deal” (Kirk 2008:278). 
Precisely because of the suspicion that ethnic lobbies put the interests of their ancestral 
homelands before those of the United States, such groups have passionate critics (Huntington 
2004; Smith 2000). With this backdrop, the finding that the Bush administration cooperated so 
actively with the Indian American groups and encouraged their lobbyism may be surprising. For 
the Bush administration it could make sense because Congress was skeptical to the nuclear deal. 
The well connected activists in the Indian American community had ties with many Democratic 
legislators in Congress.  Moreover, the endorsement of the Indian American lobbying, as the 
statement from President Bush (see quote, p.1) would indicate, was probably also valued because 
they could disseminate American views in their “homeland’s affairs”. Contrary to the view 
exposed by Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), where ethnic interest groups tend to be perceived as 
liabilities rather than assets in the U.S. foreign policy arena; this finding would correspond well 
  90 
 
with Shain’s(1999) observation that ethnic lobbies indeed can be of benefit for American 
policymakers. 
An observation made by no other than K. Subrahmanyam, the legend and doyen of India’s 
strategic community, may underscore the argument made here that the potential gains of the 
Indian American factor, may in fact be just as beneficial for the United States:66  
In all probability India may prefer a preeminent US to a preeminent China.  
People have asked whether India would lean towards China on the basis of Asian 
solidarity. But soon there will be a few million Indians in the US, and it is hardly 
likely there would be even a few tens of thousands of Indians in China. That 
factor will decisively tilt India in favour of the U.S.  The time has come for the 
U.S. and India to get closer and assert their natural friendship, validating what 
Bhishma said on his deathbed: “Circumstances determine friends and enemies.” 
(quoted in Mohan 2006: 78) 
8.3.3. Increasing the size of ‘win-sets’ on both sides? 
Two-level theory holds that statesmen are Janus-faced, bargaining internationally with other 
governments and domestically with political parties and interest groups to get an agreement 
ratified. Members of ethnic interest groups, by their very nature, are Janus-faced too, with dual 
loyalties: as in the words of Sanjay Puri:  
That is what globalization has done. That’s the beauty of globalization. You can 
take the best of both places. Big market here, big market there. That’s the thing, 
Indian Americans have a lot of business activity going back and forth, but we 
don’t take orders from anyone. (Interview 30.09.08)  
Having access to the political leadership in the U.S. and India, the lobby activity of the Indian 
American community may increase the respective ‘win-sets’ and make the “domestic tables” in 
both India and the U.S. more amenable to future bilateral undertakings. In short, it may help 
bring promising U.S.-India relations, so often troubled by mutual mistrust in the past, on a firmer 
footing in the future.  
                                                 
 
66 K. Subrahmanyam has had a large number of prominent positions in the government of India, being inter alia the governor of 
the National Security Council Board in the BJP-government. At present he heads the task-force appointed by Prime Minister 
Singh on 'Global Strategic Developments'. 
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8.4 Concluding remarks  
Indian Americans, it seems, have established themselves with a place “around the table” in the 
U.S. foreign policy arena (cf. Smith’s statement p.3). This thesis has looked into what lays 
behind the surge in the Indian American community’s political clout. A few factors stand out: 
• A favorable international strategic context. 
• A strong financial, intellectual and organizational capacity that gives the group 
disproportional influence considering its still modest demographic strength.  
• Previously fragmented, the nuclear deal was a catalyst that unified the community and 
helped consolidate lobby capabilities. 
• Alliance building first and foremost with the Israel lobby, but also with the wider U.S. 
business community. This networking has expanded Indian Americans’ scope of 
influence, but even more important; there is a learning-effect—Indian Americans have 
been taught the rules of the game.  
Another aim of this thesis was to look at how a two-level framework could shed light on the role 
of politically mobilized Diasporas. The case of the Indian American lobby reveals how such 
groups can have a quality as “two-table players”—able to participate in the domestic politics of 
two countries simultaneously.  
• This unique strategic position (as carriers of a message—whether lobbying Communists 
in West Bengal, the BJP or Democrats) is indeed also a part of the groups’ power base 
and an additional explanation why its political clout has surged;  
• State actors, both representing India and the U.S., therefore, saw the Indian American 
lobby as a particularly useful ally and interacted closely with these groups. Because of 
their distinct “two-table” quality, the Indian American scope of influence was not limited 
to influencing domestic opposition, but even the ‘win-set’ of the respective, ‘foreign’ 
counterpart. Attempting to increase win-sets on two sides, Indian Americans should, 
theoretically at least, have increased the chances of overlapping ‘win-sets’.  
Given how recent Indian immigration is (almost all came to the U.S. in the period after 1965, 
with the Indian American population  now growing by an impressive 10.5% annually), there is 
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good reason to believe that this distinct “two-table” quality will remain a particularly strong 
feature of the Indian American group, with a potential to grow even stronger. From a two-level 
theory perspective, the Diaspora constitutes an asset for the homeland, inasmuch as the 
immigrant group is generally well-connected, financially strong and interested in the well-being 
of Mother India, which is  still a country where a majority of 75.6% of the population, 828 
million people, live on under $2 dollars per day (Chen & Ravallion 2008). Interestingly, this 
feature of the ancient homeland should undoubtedly result in Indian Americans having a 
disproportional influence “back home”.  
The effect of the growing importance of Indian Americans is by all probability also a gain for 
U.S.-India relations. The Indian American community may influence “win-sets” in both 
countries either through “hardball lobbying” (as on the nuclear deal), or alternatively, through a 
more subtle, long-term “soft-power” impact. 
8.5 Epilogue:  Suggestions for future research 
To many Indian Americans the triumph on the nuclear agreement signaled their definite break-
through on the U.S. political scene, but also something more. Swadesh Chatterjee explains: 
We have never given up, and we believe that we have got tremendous power and 
influence and now people in Congress know that this community is strong, this 
community has got influence. So from the community’s point of view, we have 
gained something. It was a historic moment for the Indian American community, 
but really what it tells, I think, it is the beginning of the greatest alliance of the 
21st century, that is between the U.S. and India (interview 16.10) 
Similar sentiments have also been expressed by top U.S. officials: Phillip Zellikow, one of the 
Bush administration’s top bureaucrats, bluntly stated at a press conference that the goal behind 
the new approach to New Delhi was “to help India become a major world power in the 21st 
century" (Kessler 2006b). How did this development in bilateral relations from 1998-2005/6 
come about? Is this an emerging alliance?  Such a study may look at relevant “drivers” (fear of 
China, war on terror, shared values, Indian American lobby and business advocacy) and 
constraints (India’s non-aligned posture, Iran/Pakistan, asymmetry/American tendency to treat 
India as a “junior-partner” etc.) in this bilateral relationship. 
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Another field of research relevant to the U.S.-India nuclear deal could be to look at the 
consequences of the agreement for global non-proliferation efforts. The agreement challenged 
the world nuclear order at a time when it was already fragile. Were non-proliferation goals 
sacrificed at the altar of U.S.-India strategic cooperation? Have the pessimistic predictions (arms 
races, the breakdown of rules/consensus etc.) of the deal’s opponents shown any signs of 
materializing? Or, conversely, could the agreement serve as an example for the treatment of 
other NPT-outlier states such as Pakistan and Israel?  
A third field of research flowing from this thesis may focus further on Diaspora groups. One 
question to pose is: “only in America?!?” Could the phenomenon of strong ethnic interest groups 
be observed elsewhere? Another way forward may be a more focused, larger-N (statistical) 
comparison of the ethnic communities that have forged strong interest groups in the U.S. or 
alternatively, it could follow my study and see if other ethnic interest groups have similar “two-
table” qualities as the Indian Americans do?  A deeper look into the role of such groups in their 
ancient homelands affairs would be particularly interesting. In the case of the Indian (American) 
Diaspora: what are the political/economic/social/ and other impacts and influences that this 
stunningly resourceful immigrant group has in Mother India, still a developing 3rd world 
country? 
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Appendix I:  Interviewees 
 
*Andersen, Walter K. Professor of South Asia affairs at Johns Hopkins University. Interviewed 
October 8, 2008. (not quoted) 
Congressional staffer I. House of Representatives, assigned to the Foreign Relations 
Committee. Interviewed October 14, 2008.  
Congressional staffer II. House of Representatives, assigned to the Foreign Relations 
Committee. Interviewed October 23, 2008 
Chatterjee, Swadesh. Chairman of the U.S.-India Friendship Council. Interviewed October 16, 
2008  
Diplomatic representative of India. Working at the Embassy of India in Washington D.C.  
Interviewed October 26, 2008. *(Interview not taped.) 
Kimball, Daryl.  Executive Director of the Arms Association. Interviewed October 15. 2008. 
Hathaway, Robert D. Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center for 
International Studies, previously worked 12 years at House Foreign Relations Committee. 
Interviewed October 16  
*Perkovich, George. Vice President for studies, Director of the Non-Proliferation Program at 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  Interviewed October 21, 2008. (not quoted) 
Puri, Sanjay.  Chairman of the U.S.-India Political Action Committee. Interviewed September 
30, 2008 
U.S. State Department official.  Working at the Bureau of South and Central Asian affairs. 
Interviewed October 22, 2008. *(Interview not taped.) 
Vickery, Raymond.  Researcher at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies. 
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary for Commerce. Hired as a lobbyist for the U.S.-India Business 
Council on the nuclear agreement.  Interviewed October 24, 2008.  
*Squassoni, Sharon. Reasearcher on non-proliferation issues at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Interviewed October 14, 2008. (not quoted)  
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Appendix II: Interview guide 
(1)  How was the initial reaction among the lawmakers on Capitol Hill to the U.S.-India nuclear 
agreement? 
(2) The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement passed overwhelmingly in Congress. What is your 
explanation of this? i.e. What changed the opinion of legislators? 
(3) Can you identify any “tipping point” in which the debate shifted in favor of the agreement’s 
passage?  
(4) Which actors (i.e. interest groups) do you consider most important for the Congressional 
approval of the deal? 
(5) In the U.S. Congress: What issue did you see as the biggest threat to the passage of the 
agreement? Why didn’t more of the “killer amendments” pass? 
(6) How, where (which sections of lawmakers) and when (in the process) do you see the Indian 
American lobby being influential in the ratification process?  
(7) How would you describe the contact between Indian Americans and (a.) the Bush 
administration? (b.) The government of India? (c.) Other domestic interest groups? 
(8)  How would you describe the role of the India caucus in Congress? 
 
(9)  Where did you focus your lobbying efforts?  With whom did you coordinate your efforts? 
(10) Why has the political clout of Indian Americans grown in recent years? 
(11)  In what ways and to what extent did Indian Americans influence the debate back in India? 
